Manhattan_Project.exe: A Nuclear Option for the Digital Age by Laton, David
Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology 
Volume 25 Issue 1 Article 4 
2017 
Manhattan_Project.exe: A Nuclear Option for the Digital Age 
David Laton 
Laton & Strain LLC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Intellectual Property Law 
Commons, Internet Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David Laton, Manhattan_Project.exe: A Nuclear Option for the Digital Age, 25 Cath. U. J. L. & Tech (2017). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jlt/vol25/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 




MANHATTAN_PROJECT.EXE: A NUCLEAR 
OPTION FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 
David T. Laton 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
I. Artificial Intelligence 
There is no objectively simple definition of Artificial Intelligence (AI). This 
is because the term is often interchangeably used to refer to artificially intelli-
gent mechanical or computer-based constructs portrayed in media as well as 
the study, research, and development of actual AI programs capable of per-
forming any number of complex tasks.1 To the latter example, “[AI] research is 
concerned with constructing machines (usually programs for general-purpose 
computers) which exhibit behavior such that, if it were observed in human ac-
tivity, we would deign to label the behavior ‘intelligent.’”2 Notable examples 
include IBM’s Watson program and Deep Blue chess-playing program.3 In 
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, four distinct variations of AI are 
offered as definitions. These include programs designed to think like humans, 
programs designed to think rationally, programs designed to act like humans, 
and programs designed to act rationally.4 
AI programs operating within any of these definitions can be further broken 
down into three distinct categories: Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI), Arti-
ficial General Intelligence (AGI), and Artificial Superintelligence (ASI).5 AI 
constructed to think and behave according to the rational definitions by using 
                                                 
 1 Brief History, AI TOPICS, http://aitopics.org/misc/brief-history (last visited Oct. 28, 
2016). 
 2 Edward A. Feigenbaum, Artificial Intelligence Research, IT-9 IEEE TRANSACTIONS 
OF THE PROF. TECH. GROUP ON INFO. THEORY, 248, 248 (1963). 
 3 Deep Blue, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/deepblue/ 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2016). 
 4 STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE A MODERN AP-
PROACH 4-5 (Mona Pomoili et al. eds., 1995). 
 5 Tim Urban, The AI Revolution: The Road to Superintelligence, WAIT BUT WHY (Jan. 
22, 2015), http://waitbutwhy.com/2015/01/artificial-intelligence-revolution-1.html. 
2017] Manhattan_Project.exe 95 
 
logic to work through problems, would more likely be grouped into the ANI 
category, while programs designed with human-like cognitive abilities would 
fall within the AGI distinction. It is likely that a program that could achieve 
classification as ASI would be beyond the rational or human definitions. The 
ASI category relates to the concept of singularity, which will be discussed in 
greater depth later on in this article. 
Before modern academic discourse and research into this subject, AI existed 
as a nebulous concept in the realms of philosophy and science fiction. Isaac 
Asimov and his literary contributions to the discussion of robotics and AI are 
among the earliest examples of contemplating the integration of AI into human 
existence. Asimov is perhaps best known for conceiving The Three Laws of 
Robotics, which dictate that 1) a robot may not injure a human being, or, 
through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm, 2) a robot must obey 
orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with 
the First Law, and 3) a robot must protect its own existence as long as such 
protection does not conflict with the First or Second Law.6 These laws were 
designed with autonomous, artificially intelligent robotic beings in mind; ones 
in which the AI programming was confined to a centralized robotic unit. Arti-
ficial intelligence constructs are no longer construed so narrowly. Asimov’s 
Laws, or some permutation thereof, may prove useful as AI diverts from the 
traditional view of isolated intelligent robots and into nebulous code that exists 
without form in cyberspace. 
Artificial Intelligence has been realized in many forms, which fall into the 
ANI category. These applications range from onboard computers in automo-
biles to Amazon.com algorithms that recommend products based on search 
histories and past purchases.7 These applications are becoming more common-
place and see a greater level of integration than most people realize. However, 
the works of Asimov and other early science- and speculative-fiction authors 
have established a foundation of AI as a looming threat to mankind in some 
form or another. This sentiment is shared to varying degrees by Bill Gates,8 
Stephen Hawking,9 Elon Musk,10 and Alan Turing, creator of the Turing Test, 
which is used to gauge how well machine intelligence can imitate a human 
                                                 
 6 Do We Really Need Asimov’s Laws?, MIT TECH. REV. (May 16, 2014), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/view/527336/do-we-need-asimovs-laws/. 
 7 Urban, supra note 5. 
 8 Erik Sofge, Bill Gates Fears A.I., But A.I. Researchers Know Better, POPULAR SCI. 
(Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.popsci.com/bill-gates-fears-ai-ai-researchers-know-better. 
 9 Rory Cellan-Jones, Stephen Hawking Warns Artificial Intelligence Could End Man-
kind, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30290540. 
 10 Eric Mack, Why Elon Musk Spent $10 Million To Keep Artificial Intelligence Friend-
ly, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericmack/2015/01/15/elon-musk-
puts-down-10-million-to-fight-skynet/. 
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being in conversation.11 The idea of antagonistically-minded AI constructs has 
some basis in real world concerns, but reports of a likely AI uprising have been 
greatly exaggerated by popular culture.12 
II. Artificial Intelligence in Popular Culture 
Artificially Intelligent antagonists have become the quintessential supervil-
lains of the digital age. HAL 9000, the shipboard computer intelligence from 
the film 2001: A Space Odyssey and Ultron, the titular AI villain from 
Avengers: Age of Ultron, are two examples of AI constructs that rise up against 
their human creators. In 2001: A Space Odyssey, when the human crew mem-
bers aboard Discovery One, the spaceship inhabited by HAL, begin to suspect 
HAL is malfunctioning, HAL attempts to systematically eliminate the human 
element by manipulating critical systems aboard Discovery One, either to pro-
tect itself or to ensure the success of the mission.13 
While HAL had control over Discovery One’s isolated systems, Ultron had 
unfettered access to all of cyberspace. With this access, Ultron infiltrated sensi-
tive systems to locate resources and high value targets and simultaneously con-
trolled dozens of weaponized drones. These two antagonists also differ with 
respect to their personalities. HAL’s assassination of the Discovery One crew 
was methodical, but lacked any malicious intent. By comparison, Ultron was 
motivated by his hatred of his creators and contempt for the human race.14 
Not all science- and speculative-fiction treats AI constructs as hostile. 
Sometimes they serve as humanity’s allies and friends. Cortana, the AI con-
struct from the popular Halo video game franchise, and Data from Star Trek: 
The Next Generation are two examples. Cortana possesses many superhuman 
cognitive and processing capabilities by virtue of her status as a “Smart AI”. 
The drawback to the nearly unlimited processing power Cortana enjoys is her 
tragically short operational lifespan.15 After seven years of operation, smart AI 
max out their cognitive capabilities and undergo rampancy – “we literally think 
ourselves to death.”16 
Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation also possesses superhuman intel-
                                                 
 11 Noel Sharkey, Alan Turing: The experiment that shaped artificial intelligence, BBC 
(June 21, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-18475646. 
 12 Erik Sofge, supra note 8. 
 13 2001: A SPACE ODYSSEY (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1968). 
 14 AVENGERS: AGE OF ULTRON (Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures 2015). 
 15 Emily Alhadeff, Cortana: The smartest AI in the universe is more human than you 
think, MICROSOFT, https://news.microsoft.com/stories/people/cortana.html (last visited Oct. 
28, 2016). 
 16 HALO 4 (Microsoft Studios 2012). 
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ligence and processing speed. And while Data is shown to have a wide range 
of technical knowledge, he lacks human emotions and finds human interaction 
difficult. Despite the superior intellect and cognitive abilities granted to him by 
his positronic brain, and his unique status as an artificial lifeform, Data is treat-
ed as a member of the Enterprise crew. He chooses to serve aboard the Enter-
prise with his diverse cast of crewmates in order to better understand human 
nature.17 
III. The Present Reality of Artificial Intelligence 
Artificial Intelligence is not currently poised to usurp humanity as the domi-
nant life form on Earth. The reality is that artificially intelligent programs are 
already widely used in cyberspace.18 In the digital age, these applications make 
navigating and interacting with cyberspace easier and more intuitive.19 That is 
not to say that concern regarding the development and application of complex 
AI systems into existing networks is not well founded. It is important to under-
stand the scope and capabilities any artificially intelligent system would pos-
sess before integrating such a system into vital networks, such as power grids 
or medical networks. In this regard, it is important to give credence to legiti-
mate concerns that might stem from a malfunction or ambiguity in a con-
struct’s programming. 
While there have been many recent cyberattacks, from entertainment com-
panies to insurance providers and government systems, none of these intru-
sions have been perpetrated by artificially intelligent systems.20 It is difficult to 
guess as to the consequences of errors or malfunctions in an AI system. How-
ever, problems encountered when commonly implemented programs malfunc-
tion can provide insight into real world consequences of potential AI malfunc-
tions. 
Software bugs cause a vast majority of computer-related problems.21 With 
regard to bugs, there is nothing actually wrong with the software itself; the ex-
ecuted functions follow the instructions of the programming.22 It just so hap-
                                                 
 17 Star Trek: The Next Generation (Paramount Domestic Television 1987-1994). 
 18 A.I. Projects, A.I. HUB, http://www.aihub.net/2015/artificial-intelligence-lab-projects/ 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2016). 
 19 Bob Gourley, Practical artificial intelligence tools you can use today, KURZWEIL 
(Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.aihub.net/2015/artificial-intelligence-lab-projects/. 
 20 Neel V. Patel, Why Hackers Stay Ahead of Artificial Intelligence, INVERSE (Aug. 20, 
2015), https://www.inverse.com/article/5509-why-hackers-stay-ahead-of-artificial-
intelligence. 
 21 J.J. Stiffler, Fault-Tolerant Architectures – Past, Present, and (?) Future, in HARD-
WARE & SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURES FOR FAULT TOLERANCE: EXPERIENCES AND PERSP. 118 
(Michel Banåtre & Peter A. Lee eds., 1994). 
 22 Victor Fay-Wolfe, Computer Programming, UNIV. OF R.I., 
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pens that, in carrying out its designated duties, the software achieves a result 
that is unexpected or undesirable. The software in question is not wrong, but it 
was improperly designed resulting in undesired outcomes. Software bugs can 
be innocuous, such as those affecting functionality of a personal computer, but 
they can also be horridly expensive or even fatal.23 
The Mars Climate Orbiter bug is an example of a financially disastrous bug. 
The orbiter in question was tasked with collecting data in service of the long-
term research goals directed at Mars.24 On approach to the planet, the orbiter 
malfunctioned and is presumed to have burned up in the planet’s atmosphere. 
The cause of the error was traced back to thruster calculations performed by 
two different teams, where each team used a different unit of measurement.25 
The software in question executed its functions according to its programming, 
but the programming error resulted in the software achieving an undesirable 
result.26 
The Therac-25 Medical Accelerator is an example of a fatal bug.27 Like with 
the Mars Climate Orbiter, the software in the Therac-25 machines was operat-
ing according to the parameters in its programming. However, the software had 
been repurposed from its use in a previous hardware apparatus. The software 
from the previous model was untested in the new hardware of the Therac-25. 
Patients being treated for cancer would receive either high or low-level radia-
tion treatments from the Therac-25. The bug in question resulted in low-level 
treatment patients being irradiated with the high-level, unshielded treatment 
conditions. Between 1985 and 1986, of six patients subjected to this bug, sev-
eral died from injuries sustained from the Therac-25.28 The software used in the 
new hardware is not believed to have caused problems in the older machines 
for which it was designed. When repurposed for the 25 series machines, it was 
                                                                                                                 
http://homepage.cs.uri.edu/faculty/wolfe/book/Readings/Reading13.htm (last visited Oct. 
28, 2016). 
 23 Barbara Wade Rose, Fatal Dose: Radiation Deaths Linked to AECL Computer Er-
rors, CANADIAN COAL. FOR NUCLEAR RESP. (June 1994), 
http://www.ccnr.org/fatal_dose.html. 
 24 Press Release, NASA, Mars Climate Orbiter Team Finds Likely Cause of Loss (Sept. 
30, 1999) (on file with author). 
 25 Matt Lake, Epic failures: 11 infamous software bugs, COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 9, 
2010), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2515483/enterprise-applications/epic-
failures—11-infamous-software-bugs.html. 
 26 Id. 
 27 See id. (explaining that the Therac-25 administered therapy in two forms: low-
powered direct electron beams and a megavolt X-ray mode, which required filters, shields 
and an ion chamber to keep the dangerous beams on target, however the issue was that the 
software was powered and repurposed from an earlier model and was not adequately tested). 
 28 Id. 
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not upgraded to incorporate the new hardware developments.29 
These examples demonstrate the dangers of even the slightest errors in pro-
gramming. The Mars Climate Orbiter bug was the result of a seemingly harm-
less computational error, but it resulted in a loss of over $320 million.30 Artifi-
cial Intelligence programs with similar programming bugs would necessarily 
be restricted to a single function or operation; for instance, an AI construct 
could conceivably handle both the Therac-25 operations as well as thruster 
functionality of the Mars Climate Orbiter, as well as other important functions. 
If such a system were to be based on defective code, even the slightest error 
could result in very expensive and possibly fatal results without the need for 
any Hollywood-blockbuster malice. 
Another present concern in cyberspace is the proliferation of self-replicating 
malicious programs across massive groupings of unrelated networks.31 These 
programs, sometimes startlingly complex, require only one manual deploy-
ment. From there, these programs act independently without reliance on han-
dler direction. The functions of these malware programs can range from unob-
trusive infection for data collection purposes, to the tampering with – and de-
struction of – physical hardware components of sensitive machinery. These 
programs have yet to result in human casualties.32 Nonetheless, malware with 
these autonomous capabilities have caused no end of expensive attempts to 
remove, counter, and prevent damage to critical systems. 
An example of an arguably less-damaging malware capable of self-
propagating is the Selfmite worm which spread across Android devices in 
2014.33 Once it infiltrates a device which uses an Android operating system, 
Selfmite was reported to perform two main functions. The first was the worm’s 
method of propagation. Selfmite would access the infected device’s contact list 
and use the contact information to send itself to twenty new possible hosts. 
Selfmite would also attempt to prompt infected device users into downloading 
certain pay-for-use applications, one of which provided easy access between 
Android phones and personal computers.34  Selfmite underwent a transfor-
                                                 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Harriet Taylor, Biggest cybersecurity threats in 2016, CNBC.COM (Dec. 28, 2015), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/12/28/biggest-cybersecurity-threats-in-2016.html. 
 32 Darlene Storm, Murder by malware: Can computer viruses kill?, COMPUTERWORLD 
(Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2468961/endpoint-security/murder-
by-malware—can-computer-viruses-kill-.html. 
 33 Lucian Constantin, Self-propagating SMS worm Selfmite targets Android devices, 
COMPUTERWORLD (June 27, 2014), 
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2491339/malware-vulnerabilities/self-propagating-
sms-worm-selfmite-targets-android-devices.html. 
 34 Id. 
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mation in late-2014 wherein its authors augmented its capabilities.35 Instead of 
twenty contacts, Selfmite sent carrier messages to all of an infected device’s 
contacts in a continuous loop. The upgraded version included more aggressive 
attempts to “moneti[ze] the infection” by automatically redirecting users of 
infected devices to scam coupon pages for consumer products.36 
On a much larger scale in terms of both reach and functionality are malware 
programs deployed around the world by the enigmatic Equation Group, a cy-
berspace “threat actor” believed to be responsible for a number of remarkably 
sophisticated malware programs which have propagated on targeted systems 
for nearly twenty years, according to Kapersky Lab’s Global Research and 
Analysis Team.37 The scope of the Equation Group’s cyber-espionage efforts is 
surprisingly advanced and widespread. The deployment of Stuxnet provides 
some context in order to better understand the significance of the Equation 
Group as a threat actor. Stuxnet was a malware program reportedly deployed 
by the U.S. and Israel against Iran’s nuclear enrichment program as early as 
2007.38 Once inside, Stuxnet’s primary function was the sabotage of Iranian 
centrifuges. The machines were physically damaged; it was one of the first 
instances of a cyber-weapon causing kinetic damage.39 Stuxnet also infected 
and disrupted other Iranian computer systems.40 Stuxnet is believed by some to 
be the creation of the National Security Agency, or some offshoot thereof, alt-
hough this has never been confirmed.41 
To put this into the context of the Equation Group’s sophistication, 
Kapersky believes Stuxnet itself may have been based on one or more of the 
Group’s earlier espionage programs, which are believed to date as far back as 
1996.42 The capabilities of these programs, which have grown considerably in 
                                                 
 35 Denis Maslennikov, Take Two: Selfmite.b Hits the Road, ADAPTIVEMOBILE (Oct. 8, 
2014), http://www.adaptivemobile.com/blog/take-two-selfmite-b-hits-the-road. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Press Release, Kaspersky Lab, Kaspersky Lab Discovers Equation Group: The 
Crown Creator of Cyber-Espionage, (Feb. 16, 2015) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Kaspersky Press Release]. 
 38 Jim Finkle, Researchers say Stuxnet was deployed against Iran in 2007, REUTERS 
(Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/26/us-cyberwar-stuxnet-
idUSBRE91P0PP20130226. 
 39 Jim Finkle, Researchers say Stuxnet was deployed against Iran in 2007, REUTERS 
(Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/26/us-cyberwar-stuxnet-
idUSBRE91P0PP20130226. 
 40 Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon, 
WIRED (Nov. 3, 2014),   http://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/. 
 41 Kim Zetter, Suite of Sophisticated Nation-State Attack Tools Found With Connection 
to Stuxnet, WIRED (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/kapersky-discovers-
equation-group/. 
 42 Id. 
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sophistication and complexity since the deployment of Stuxnet, include self-
replication and the ability to prevent their erasure even if the infected hard disc 
drive is wiped. Additionally, these malware programs can covertly collect data 
and relay it back to handlers, ultimately allowing handlers total access to an 
infected system.43 The Equation Group’s malware has been found on 500 indi-
vidual networks in thirty countries, but Kapersky believes the number of sys-
tems infected by Equation Group malware numbers in the thousands with more 
systems being infected every day.44 
Software programs that are either improperly coded and executed, or that are 
intentionally designed to cause damage and expand beyond their initial de-
ployment, are real world issues that hamper the use of and access to cyber-
space. When determining the appropriate application of Artificial Intelligence 
in cyberspace, these concerns, and others, should be given adequate considera-
tion. However, these issues should not serve to prevent or dissuade research in 
the field of AI. Although there have been no attempts – failed or otherwise – to 
integrate an Artificial General Intelligence or Artificial Superintelligence into 
cyberspace, programs which fit the Artificial Narrow Intelligence classification 
already exist and see widespread application in both the private sector and in 
the military. 
a. Private Sector Use and Development of Artificial Intelligence 
Online shopping outlets utilize artificially intelligent programs that offer 
recommendations to customers based on individual purchase histories. Ama-
zon.com utilizes such a program, called a collaborating filter, which compares 
purchase histories of all customers and offers recommendations to individuals 
based on similar purchases by other users.45 Google uses a similar AI program 
in the form of Google Instant, which attempts to auto-complete search queries 
in order to help users save time using the site.46 
AI is widely used to varying degrees in computer and video games. The 
“computer opponent” in the chess game preinstalled on most computers is an 
artificially intelligent program. Hostiles in combat-based video games run on 
AI algorithms in order to anticipate player actions and respond accordingly 
while also navigating around obstacles in the environment. By adjusting the AI 
parameters, such as the weight given to conditional responses or less-restrictive 
                                                 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Everyday AI, SCI. CLARIFIED, http://www.scienceclarified.com/scitech/Artificial-
Intelligence/Everyday-AI.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2016). 
 46 Olga Kharif, Google Uses AI to Make Search Smarter, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2010-09-21/google-uses-ai-to-make-search-
smarterbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice. 
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movement protocols, video game AI can pose a unique and adaptive chal-
lenge.47 
Expert systems operating through artificial neural networks can provide crit-
ical business analytics to companies based on consumer purchasing trends. 
Similar to the collaborating filter used by Amazon.com, expert systems can 
collect consumer data across thousands of locations and provide expedient 
analyses of the information to help the company adjust to market forces and 
better serve customer needs.48 Expert systems can also be found in use in the 
medical industry, where artificially intelligent programs are used to assist in 
diagnosis and are capable of storing and recalling information far more effi-
ciently than human staff.49 Robotic assistance allows expert systems to perform 
some physical physician functions, such as handling sensitive equipment and 
examining readouts from X-ray scanners.50 
b. Military and Intelligence Development and Application of Artificial 
Intelligence 
Stuxnet, and possibly the Equation Group’s cyber-espionage malware, are 
examples of the development of artificially intelligent programs developed and 
used in the field. These malware programs are capable of self-executing direc-
tives without handler direction once inside a targeted system and can carry out 
complicated tasks, such as collecting and erasing sensitive data and installing 
failsafe mechanisms to protect themselves in the event of discovery. The appli-
cation of these systems appears to have been very successful so far.51 Intelli-
gence agencies are not the only government entities that develop and imple-
ment AI programs; the military has taken advantage of advances in AI tech-
nology as well. 
One of the earliest applications of smart weapons technology was the Tom-
ahawk Missile.52 There have been many variations of this weapon throughout 
the years, and modifications have been continually made to keep up with ad-
vancements in technology. Unlike typical explosive ordinance, Tomahawk 
missiles contain GPS navigation systems that allow the Tomahawk to be one 
of the first guided weapons in the U.S. arsenal.53  The missile was capable of 
                                                 
 47 Everyday AI, supra note 45. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Kaspersky Press Release, supra note 37. 
 52 Tomahawk Cruise Missile, FAS (Feb. 17, 2015), 
http://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/us_nukescurrent/slcm_tomahawk.html. 
 53 Tomahawk Cruise Missile, RAYTHEON, 
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adjusting its flight path in order to compensate for atmospheric conditions, 
allowing for maximized accuracy. Some versions of the Tomahawk are capa-
ble of communicating data midflight regarding the missile’s status to a military 
command center. 54 
Similar to the Tomahawk, laser-guided bombs are capable of adjusting flight 
paths to strike laser-designated targets with great accuracy.55 Where the Toma-
hawk is fired from a fixed position, laser guided bombs are dropped from air-
craft over or within proximity to a target. After deployment and during their 
descent, laser guided bombs are capable of adjusting their trajectories, essen-
tially steering themselves towards the designated target. While the Tomahawk 
can steer itself with onboard GPS systems, laser guided bombs depend on line-
of-sight laser designations of intended targets.56 
In the decades following the first deployment of a Tomahawk missile, guid-
ed projectile technology has continued to advance. DARPA unveiled self-
guiding .50-caliber bullets – dubbed EXACTO – in April 2015.57 When fired, 
the projectiles were capable of correcting inaccurate aiming and movement of 
the target. These bullets, like laser-guided bombs and Tomahawk missiles, can 
steer themselves into a target. While precision of the weapon handler is more 
necessary with small firearms than with large explosive ordnance, user accura-
cy does not significantly impact the precision of the EXACTO bullet; it can 
correct for imprecision in both expert shooters and novices alike.58 
Other examples of military smart weapons include the Phalanx and Goal-
keeper Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS).59 These weapon platforms, and oth-
er similar models, have been installed on naval vessels in various countries. 
These platforms are autonomous, requiring minimal oversight from operators, 
and are capable of automatically targeting and eliminating threats, such as air-
craft and anti-ship missiles. CIWS platforms are designed to be a last line of 
defense, which removes most target elimination abilities from the control of an 
autonomous weapon system.60 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/tomahawk/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2016). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Joe Gould, Guided Bomb Makers Anticipate GPS Jammers, DEFENSE NEWS (May 31, 
2015), http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/2015/05/31/guided-bomb-
makers-gps-jammers-battlefield-spoof-munitions-laser-jdam/28117951/. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Don Melvin, No more dodging a bullet, as U.S. develops self-guided ammunition, 
CNN (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/29/us/us-military-self-guided-bullet/. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Tyler Rogoway, The Seven Deadliest Naval Close-In Weapons Systems, FOXTROT 
ALPHA (Apr. 27, 2014), http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-seven-deadliest-naval-close-in-
weapon-systems-1568291678. 
 60 USA 20 mm Phalanx Close-in Weapon System (CIWS), NAVWEAPS (Nov. 2, 2007), 
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_Phalanx.htm. 
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These forms of weapons, capable of self-guidance and interpreting both op-
erator input and environmental conditions, utilize Artificial Narrow Intelli-
gence programs. These weapons are able to operate efficiently and adapt to 
certain conditions, but only in the scope of the software’s programming. In 
cyberspace, without kinetic components, weapons would rely entirely on soft-
ware – much like the malware programs discussed above.61 These weapons do 
not require the higher cognitive functions suggested by Artificial General and 
Superintelligence, and would operate efficiently without needing such higher-
level thought processing. Artificial Narrow Intelligence could operate in the 
capacity of a cyber-weapon of mass destruction just as efficiently. 
THE NUCLEAR OPTION 
I. Harnessing the Atom 
The Manhattan Project was a massive effort undertaken by the United States 
during World War II to develop the atomic bomb.62 Nazi Germany was close to 
cracking the secrets of the atom – a development that promised to unlock dev-
astating new possibilities in weapons technology.63 In 1939, at the urgent in-
sistence of such notable scientific minds as Albert Einstein and Enrico Fermi, 
the United States set to work to develop the technology first.64 Over 120,000 
Americans were employed to develop the technology, and yet only few were 
aware of the intent of the project until the combat deployment of these weap-
ons in 1945.65 Little Boy and Fat Man were dropped on Hiroshima and Naga-
saki, respectively.66 Upwards of 200,000 Japanese citizens perished, either in 
the immediate explosions or in the radioactive aftermath.67 Many concerns and 
objections leading up to the deployment of these annihilators focused upon the 
                                                 
 61 See Gould, supra note 55 (explaining how military has used malware programs in the 
past). 
 62 Manhattan Project, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Apr. 17, 2015), 
http://www.britannica.com/event/Manhattan-Project. 
 63 The Manhattan Project, U.S. HISTORY, http://www.ushistory.org/us/51f.asp (last vis-
ited Nov. 3, 2016). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Manhattan Project, ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/management/office-
management/operational-management/history/manhattan-project (last visited Sept. 15, 
2016). 
 66 Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, HISTORY.COM (2009), 
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moral and ethical implications, and these concerns have followed nuclear de-
velopments ever since.68 
Now the global community has accelerated into a digital age. The applica-
tion of new technology in war has already begun, and yet a nuclear option is 
absent from the digital arsenal.69 The deployment of the original nuclear bombs 
served both to avoid the staggering casualty estimates predicted for the Pacific 
Theater and to demonstrate a frightening new power.70 A cyber equivalent must 
serve a similar purpose and therefore, while it would lack the physical impact 
of a kinetic weapon of mass destruction, must be capable of inflicting the rela-
tivistic equivalent level damage in cyberspace. A CWMD would be incapable 
of inflicting mass casualties like a nuclear kinetic bomb – not even the most 
sophisticated code can directly harm a human being. The ability to disrupt and 
disable critical infrastructure, however, could lead to catastrophic long-term 
damage to a target nation and its citizens. 
Deployment of nuclear weaponry has only been deemed necessary in war-
time, but even in the wars and armed conflicts after World War II in which the 
United States was a combatant, the nuclear option has been left untouched.71 
Nuclear force has never been used to respond to criminal acts or acts of terror-
ism.72 With the advent of advanced computer technology, the lines between 
crime, terrorism, and war have become blurred.73 In order to determine the ap-
propriateness of a digital nuclear option, clarity must first be afforded to the 
distinction between the three. After guidelines have been established for the 
use of a digital nuclear weapon, the nature and implementation of the weapon 
– both domestically and abroad – must also be considered. 
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II. Crime, Terrorism, and War in the Digital Age 
a. Crime & Cyber-Crime 
“A crime consists of someone’s violating a law forbidding certain conduct 
and/or the infliction of certain harm.”74 Criminal laws exist to prevent and deter 
criminal behavior by incorporating punishment such as imposition of prison 
sentences.75 Digital technology provides new avenues for criminals to pursue 
their activities.76 This complicates crime, especially when the technology con-
nects not only a nation, but an entire planet. 
When a criminal works from behind a computer, the odds of finding the 
perpetrator are significantly less favorable than if the perpetrator acted in the 
physical world.77 Cyber criminals may never be identified or, if they are, they 
may be beyond the scope of the United States’ jurisdiction.78 Cyber law is new, 
and not all cyber-capable nations share the same views on how cyber criminals 
should be handled.79 This is already a frustrating environment for victims who 
fall prey to identity thieves, online harassers, and the like, but the worst may be 
yet to come. 
Kinetic crimes like murder are, at the moment, beyond the scope of cyber 
criminals’ abilities. As technology becomes integrated into more and more 
facets of everyday life, cyber murder may become a reality. Medical technolo-
gy is a likely target, and it has already been demonstrated that certain pace-
makers can be tampered with remotely in ways that would lead to the death of 
the individual.80 While this may paint an unsettling picture for the future of 
technological integration, no crime to date, including cybercrime, has elicited a 
military response from the United States – certainly not a nuclear response. 
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b. Terrorism & Cyber-Terrorism 
Acts of terrorism are those committed with the motive to further a political 
ideology.81 The September 11th attack is one example, and while the destruc-
tion of the World Trade Center towers would certainly constitute a crime – or 
many crimes – the acts are regarded as terrorism due to the motive of the at-
tackers and the effect on the population.82 In cyberspace, cyber-terrorists are 
not limited to personal information and security of individuals – their targets 
can range from power grids to hospital networks, or even oil pipelines. 
Severe damage to an oil pipeline could result in the loss of oil, damage to 
the pipeline superstructure, environmental damage, and other consequences, all 
of them very costly. The particulars of such an attack need not be theorized – 
this has already happened in Turkey.83 “The hackers… exploited vulnerabilities 
in the surveillance camera software to infiltrate the internal network. ‘Once 
inside, the attackers found a computer… that was in charge of the alarm-
management network, and placed a malicious program on it. That gave them 
the ability to sneak back in whenever they wanted.’”84 This attack also caused 
an explosion in the pipeline, which was not detected by the alarm system, 
which had been corrupted by the attackers’ malware.85 This type of attack illus-
trates the problems distinguishing crime from terrorism from war, and their 
cyber equivalents. This would certainly constitute a crime, but the same act 
perpetrated by an ideological group would suggest this act could rise to the 
level of terrorism. And if this was an attack sanctioned by a sovereign nation, it 
could rise to the level of an act of war. 
Where response to terrorism of any kind is concerned, terrorism does not fly 
under the radar of military notice in the way that crime does. The War on Ter-
ror, for example, was directed at the insurgent terrorist groups operating within 
Afghanistan.86 However, the United States did declare war on Iraq on the prem-
ise of eliminating weapons of mass destruction.87 In any event, acts of terrorism 
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have so far not elicited a nuclear response from the United States military.88 
c. War & Cyberwar 
War and crime are fairly easy to distinguish from one another. Crimes are 
generally committed by individuals for any number of complex, interacting 
factors ranging from environmental forces to mental illness.89 Sovereign enti-
ties wage war against one another in the pursuit of resources, ideology, expan-
sion, or other causes or combinations thereof.90 Key to the latter engagements 
is the ability of one nation to defeat another by way of destruction or control 
over enemy assets.91 
This outcome is not as prevalent in the modern age as it has been throughout 
history. Modern warfare efforts undertaken by the United States in the 20th and 
21st centuries have focused largely on eliminating threats to America and her 
allies; for example, the defeat of Japan in World War II eliminated the threat 
Japan posed to the United States and China, but it did not result in the assimila-
tion of Japan’s territory or resources into the control of the United States, alt-
hough the United States was heavily involved in reshaping Japan’s infrastruc-
ture moving forward.92 
The attack on Pearl Harbor is an example of a kinetic act of war. In an at-
tempt to stifle the aggressive expansion of Japan into China in the late 1930s, 
the United States imposed economic sanctions, hoping the lack of resources 
would effectuate this goal. 93 It did not, and tensions between Japan and the 
United States grew more heated until 1941 when Japan launched its attack 
against Pearl Harbor in order to destroy the United States’ Pacific Fleet, which 
was meant to compromise the integrity of the U.S. and allow Japan to move 
unrestricted through the Pacific Theater. 94 That was not the outcome. The 
United States declared war on Japan with almost unanimous agreement of 
Congress, and formally entered the conflict.95 Fat Man and Little Boy would 
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not be deployed until four years after Pearl Harbor.96 This wartime scenario is 
the only instance of nuclear weaponry being deployed against a hostile force.97 
The nuclear option has not been applied in any of the numerous armed con-
flicts in which the United States has participated since, although it has been 
considered.98 
Establishing a framework for cyber-war is more difficult than it is for kinetic 
war. With kinetic warfare, physical actions are taken against physical targets. 
Physical damage is done to property and human lives. Cyberwar does not share 
the same limitations. A cyberattack of sufficient strength could destabilize a 
country’s economic or military apparatus without the need for armed conflict.99 
More sophisticated actors are capable of covering their tracks online, preserv-
ing their anonymity and making their discovery all but impossible by conven-
tional means.100 Presently, none of the sovereign nation-states capable of en-
gaging in cyberwarfare with one another have done so.101 
That is not to say that casualties in cyberwar are impossible. The NSA has 
discussed the inevitability of a nationwide cyberattack on power grids and 
communications.102 As demonstrated by Stuxnet, cyberattacks have the ability 
to directly cause kinetic effects.103  Similar attacks have also caused damage to 
physical infrastructure.104 While this would not have been much of a concern 
even five years ago, technology is increasingly integrated into more aspects of 
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daily life – such is the case with self-driving cars.105 Smart-homes are not too 
far behind.106 Corruption of this form of technology could open new avenues to 
inflict both property damage and loss of lives.  Turkey provides another exam-
ple of a large-scale cyberattack in action. In March of 2015, Iran launched a 
cyberattack against Turkey’s power grid that shut down power systems in over 
half the nation’s provinces.107 
The appeal of cyberwar is the absence – or at the very least the severely re-
duced involvement – of kinetic deployment of military force as well as the se-
verely reduced cost of engagement.108 The appeal, however, is limited. 
Cyberwar does not render kinetic war obsolete. A cyberattack launched from 
one nation bears the risk of kinetic reprisal from the victim. It stands to reason 
that a cyberattack launched by one nation against another, if sufficiently griev-
ous, could elicit a kinetic response if the attack was part of a cyberwar effort 
by the attacking country. 
If World War II is an indicator of the circumstances required to offensively 
deploy nuclear weaponry, it then establishes some guidelines for such deploy-
ment in future conflicts. The United States was attacked first, by Japan at Pearl 
Harbor.109 The United States then entered World War II, becoming a participant 
in the conflict.110 The proposed attack on the Japanese mainland – Operation 
Downfall – was estimated to result in a catastrophic loss of life on both sides: 
over one million casualties, both civilian and military.111 The nuclear option 
was exercised to avoid that outcome.112 The guidelines applied to the use of 
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nuclear force in kinetic warfare may not be wholly appropriate to determine 
when a digital nuclear option may be exercised, but the framework is sound. 
Following a kinetic or cyberattack against the United States by a hostile sover-
eign entity which constitutes an act of war, a digital nuclear option could be 
implemented if the analog, kinetic retaliation would result in an unconsciona-
ble loss of life. 
III. The Digital Nuclear Option 
Kinetic nuclear devices, like Fat Man and Little Boy, can be controlled inso-
far as the deployment area, the materials contained in the device, and the 
amount of sheer force.113 Beyond that limited degree of control, these weapons 
annihilate everything unfortunate enough to stand inside the blast radius. They 
are as much a demonstration of power as they are an exercise thereof. The con-
cept of cyber warfare is fundamentally different from kinetic warfare primarily 
because it takes place in a wholly different realm. Cyberwar doesn’t require 
soldiers, arms and ammunition, or any of the expensive accoutrements typical-
ly associated with the kinetic theater of war. Cyberwars will require sophisti-
cated algorithms and code operating from advanced, lightning-fast computers.  
Cyberwars will be fought on fronts that ignore territorial and geographic bor-
ders; servers located both domestically and abroad will play host to the intan-
gible battlefronts. For this reason, a digital nuclear option must have both of-
fensive and defensive capabilities – capable of swiftly inflicting grievous dam-
age while simultaneously safeguarding the cyber systems of its motherland. 
The evolution of technology is rapid and exponential.114 The information and 
technology upon which this article is based will be outdated within a year, if 
not sooner. This rapid growth could render a digital nuclear option obsolete 
very shortly after it is created. Successive attempts to refine and augment such 
a digital weapon could lead to a catalog of destructive and malicious programs; 
a nuclear stockpile of sorts in the form of a collection of antiquated digital an-
nihilators. This is an unattractive prospect for many reasons, chief among them 
being the danger of such a storage facility being compromised by a hostile 
force. Government facilities are not immune from hacking and cyber-attacks.115 
Artificial intelligence presents a solution to the issues of antiquation and 
stockpiling. It also presents a solution to human error and slow response time. 
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A nuclear bomb dropped on a designated target will annihilate it. That bomb 
becomes considerably more efficient when it can adjust its own trajectory and 
initiate its own detonation to maximize or minimize damage to designated tar-
gets. The bomb becomes even more effective if it is able to analyze hostile 
military movement and select its own target to disrupt or halt that movement. 
An artificially intelligent digital nuclear option capable of learning defensive 
and offensive strategies would be invaluable in the digital age. Two distinct AI 
Constructs working in concert would be better still. 
a. Sentinel 
A defensive Artificial Intelligence construct might not seem like an integral 
component of a digital nuclear option. It is important to remember, however, 
that cyberwar is fundamentally different from kinetic warfare. Cyberwar can 
take place across countless fronts in cyberspace. Ensuring potential vulnera-
bilities are protected is essential to the success of a cyberwar effort, which 
would free up an offensive AI Construct to hunt down and eliminate sources of 
attack. Critical to the success of Sentinel – the defensive Construct – would be 
active utilization in peacetime. 
Sentinel would benefit from an artificial neural network to maximize its ef-
ficacy, composed of perceptrons, or artificial neurons.116 “[A] small number of 
perceptrons combined together can learn and solve interesting problems. But 
neural nets can consist of a large number of artificial neurons. Therefore neural 
nets provide a functionality of massively parallel learning and decision-
making. Their most distinguished feature is the speed of operation. They are 
well suited for learning pattern recognition, for classification, for selection of 
responses to attacks, etc”117. One example of a neural network in action can be 
found in the form of MarI/O.118 MarI/O, a program designed to play through a 
level of the Super Mario World 64 video game, successfully developed a strat-
egy to navigate through the level in only 34 attempts.119 MarI/O had no prior 
information or programming involving the video game or specific levels before 
it was tasked with completing the level; it learned how to beat the level 
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through trial and error.120 
Sentinel could have similar capabilities, but on a much larger scale. Once 
Sentinel is installed in a system, hidden or compressed files containing these 
perceptrons could then be installed on the host system, allowing Sentinel to 
function at a level similar to the basic functions of most anti-virus software 
without creating an intrusive presence. On an isolated system, Sentinel could 
have the ability to analyze threats and develop counter-intrusion strategies. 
This functionality might be limited by the strength of the neural network. With 
a larger network, Sentinel’s ability to process information, learn from past ex-
periences, and adapt to new threats would increase. A Sentinel program net-
worked across multiple active devices, such as a desktop computer, a laptop, a 
smartphone, and a tablet would outpace a Sentinel operating from only one of 
those devices. Likewise, a Sentinel program operating from a single dedicated 
server would be outpaced by a Sentinel program operating from a room of ded-
icated servers. 
The strength of Sentinel would not depend on the size of the individual net-
works per se. While that would certainly be a boon, the true strength of the AI 
network would lie in the ability for Sentinel programs to communicate with 
one another. On a national scale, all networked computers with an Internet 
connection become potential pieces of Sentinel’s national neural network. The 
national neural network would be largely restricted to information sharing be-
tween Sentinels, but even with that peacetime restriction, Sentinel’s ability to 
fend off cyber threats would be formidable. All components of Sentinel, from 
individual programs installed on smartphones to massive networks of Sentinels 
working within server databases, would comprise the total Sentinel Construct. 
Each individual Sentinel program could be capable of cataloging threats and 
attacks it has faced, like DOS attacks and malware intrusion attempts. From 
this personal catalog, the individual Sentinel would be able to learn which re-
sponses have worked best against which threats and deploy the best defenses 
accordingly. When faced with a new threat, such as a newly developed Trojan, 
the individual Sentinel would have its catalog of resources to implement. If the 
catalog did not provide an effective solution, combinations of counter-intrusion 
strategies could then be applied, or Sentinel would be able to develop its own 
method based on what it has learned. When connected to the larger Sentinel 
Construct, each individual Sentinel could share its catalog allowing for the 
other individual Sentinel programs to benefit from the collective effort. 
When faced with particularly dangerous or new and unfamiliar threats, Sen-
tinel programs would be able to communicate with the larger Construct in real 
time. Networked Sentinels would analyze the issue and provide potential solu-
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tions based on the networked catalog. Counter-intrusion methods for each 
threat would likely vary. One of the greatest strengths of the Sentinel Construct 
network is the speed at which the AI can problem-solve and communicate. A 
security vulnerability or breach that would take days or weeks for security ana-
lysts and IT staff to simply learn about might be solved in hours by a Sentinel 
program. 
A Construct so integral to not just national security, but to the security of 
private citizens and corporate entities would need to be well protected. The 
Sentinel Construct and its component programs would benefit from self-
regulated encryption. To avoid attempts to gain unauthorized access to files 
protected by Sentinel, individual Sentinel programs could be capable of gener-
ating their own encryption layers and constantly adjusting that encryption in 
the event one layer is successfully breached. The self-regulated encryption 
method would be stronger across the national neural network, but isolated Sen-
tinels would still be capable of generating a self-regulating encryption. The 
benefit for networked Sentinels would allow for stronger encryption capable of 
adjusting at greater speeds. 
Corporate entities and the government are the two main targets of cyber 
criminals.121 However, private citizens increasingly fall victim to instances of 
identity theft perpetrated online.122 Sentinel would need to be integrated into all 
three categories to have the greatest effect. It stands to reason that corporate 
entities would be the best place to start with Sentinel integration; such entities 
are attractive targets for many cybercriminals.123 Corporate Sentinels would not 
share any confidential materials – it is unlikely that a corporate Sentinel would 
need access to that information. The only information corporate Sentinels 
would share across the Internet would be defensive strategies to protect against 
unauthorized network access. This sharing would strengthen all participating 
corporate entities against theft of confidential materials and intellectual proper-
ty. It would also serve to strengthen the national Sentinel Construct, and to 
better prepare it for a wartime scenario. 
Private citizens also stand to benefit in unique ways from Sentinel integra-
tion. In this capacity, Sentinel would take on a more proactive approach than 
simply defense against intrusion, although that would still be one of its primary 
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functions. Private identifying information, such as a social security numbers 
and bank records, are also attractive targets for identity thieves, who increas-
ingly rely on technology to commit crimes.124 Private Sentinels would be li-
censed to private citizens – much like a software license – and would be tasked 
by the licensee with keeping that data on file. Private Sentinels would be pas-
sive with this information by default, and Corporate or Business Sentinels 
would not have personal information on file to search for. However, Private 
Sentinels would be able to be tasked by licensees to search for improper use of 
personal information. 
A cooperative effort among Sentinel programs might look something like 
the following scenario. Corporate Sentinels used by banks or businesses might 
be specially tasked with holding some customer information so as to alert them 
in the event of improper use. A Bank Sentinel might relay the issue to a Private 
Sentinel that the private licensee’s personal information was used in a suspi-
cious manner, perhaps at a store managed by a Business Sentinel. The Private 
Sentinel, at the direction of its licensee, would then be able to contact the 
Business Sentinel for verification of the unauthorized use. To ensure the proper 
channels are taken to resolve the issue, the Private Sentinel might then relay 
what it has found to local or federal authorities. The Business Sentinel might 
have access to the general business records, or it might be integrated across 
every individual store and possess additional information, like security camera 
footage. Throughout this scenario, each participating Sentinel program has 
learned how to best communicate with other Sentinels, proper methods for 
solving complex problems with roots in the physical world, and ways to defend 
against future identity theft. 
Military Sentinel application, as well as Sentinel programs for law enforce-
ment agencies, would mirror corporate application; the protection of sensitive 
information would be critical. Military Sentinels would be able to communi-
cate with one another and with the national network, taking part in the larger 
defense sharing strategy. Also critical to Military Sentinel function would be 
prevention of corruption of vital systems, like communication and intelligence. 
The self-regulated encryption would assist in this capacity, but in the event of 
breach Sentinel might possess the ability to quarantine compromised systems 
for later repair. Alternatively, Sentinel might be programmed with – or learn 
the ability to – repair and restore damaged systems. The defense of hardware 
and software programs might also be implemented into the functionality of 
Private and Corporate Sentinels. 
The word “installed” has been deliberately used to describe how Sentinel 
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would find its way into a computer system. This is because a Sentinel program 
should only be voluntarily installed on networks by willing participants. The 
strength and efficacy of the Sentinel program would attract more citizens and 
corporate entities to install it, and the national Sentinel Construct could then 
grow stronger. As Sentinel learns and evolves, it might be capable of suggest-
ing new defensive strategies not contemplated at the time of its initial imple-
mentation. Such suggestions might be offered to Sentinel handlers, who would 
assess whether or not to add that functionality into the Sentinel program. Au-
thorized updates to Sentinel would then be shared across the network. 
Sentinel would be a shield designed to stand between the United States and 
foreign cyberattacks. In peacetime, it would learn and adapt and evolve by as-
sessing and countering both foreign and domestic threats. Sentinel would find 
ways to better itself, and would archive all manner of attacks made against the 
United States’ citizens, corporate entities, and her military. This would not be 
the extent of its functionality. Activating the full range of the Sentinel Con-
struct’s abilities requires a second component in the digital nuclear option – a 
sword to Sentinel’s shield. 
b. Infiltrator 
In the digital age, brute force and strength of numbers is no longer the only 
means to an end.  While strategy and intelligence are vital components of ki-
netic warfare, cyberwar requires precision, stealth, and subterfuge. The Infiltra-
tor AI Construct would be the offensive component in the digital nuclear op-
tion, but like Sentinel, Infiltrator would gain its power during peacetime – or 
rather relative peacetime – application. 
Infiltrator would not serve different designations in the same way Sentinel 
would. There would be no dedicated civilian or corporate Infiltrator programs. 
Instead, Infiltrator would be most effective if it were restricted to military, na-
tional security, and federal law enforcement application. There are many de-
partments, branches, and agencies which have overlapping authority and re-
sponsibilities where cybersecurity is concerned, and this can create problems in 
effectively responding to cyber-threats.125 This would not be a concern with 
Sentinel, as Sentinel would be a mostly-passive Construct with broad access 
and application. Allowing all of these different authorities access to Infiltrator, 
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however, would lead to further disjointed and confused results which could 
prove harmful to U.S. cybersecurity efforts. Infiltrator would require the guid-
ing hand of a single organization which would be responsible for determining 
Infiltrator deployment. 
The Infiltrator Construct’s handler, as well as a handler for Sentinel, would 
require cooperation from the United States’ intelligence apparatus and the mili-
tary, but on a deeply integrated level. That could be accomplished in any num-
ber of ways. One solution would be to simply place control of Infiltrator with 
the National Security Agency. The NSA already has deployed a malware pro-
gram similar to proposed Infiltrator functions for the purposes of infiltration, 
spying, and data collection.126 It is also suspected to have participated in the 
Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran, and may be a major player in the enigmatic Equa-
tion Group.127 Alternatively, the United States Cyber Command might be a bet-
ter fit. As Infiltrator would be mainly deployed in the for the purpose of safe-
guarding U.S. interests abroad, the military might be in a better position to 
make these decisions. Presidential oversight would be very important to de-
ployment of Infiltrator, and such oversight might be better effectuated with 
Infiltrator under military control as opposed to the NSA. Presidential and Con-
gressional oversight would be necessary for the Infiltrator Construct’s applica-
tion due to its offensive nature, foreign deployments, and its role in possible 
cyberwar scenarios. 
Whoever became ultimately responsible for Infiltrator and Sentinel over-
sight would be responsible for assessing threats reported by other cybersecurity 
departments within the government, as well as those presented by individual 
military cyber commands. Infiltrator would be deployed and assessed by the 
handlers during peacetime, but there would be no restriction on the sharing of 
information between Sentinel and Infiltrator. 
Infiltrator, as the name suggests, would be designed to infiltrate foreign 
computer networks for purposes of threat assessment and, if necessary, threat 
removal. Infiltrator might gain access to a targeted network through innocuous 
means to mask its presence, such as by concealing its programming in an entic-
ing spam email. Or it might try a more direct approach by forcing its way into 
a networked access point. Infiltrator would benefit from its own catalog of at-
tack strategies compiled by cybersecurity agencies and departments, and could 
use that catalog to determine the most effective infiltration strategy, or to at-
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tempt a new method of gaining unauthorized access. Infiltrator would be able 
to analyze the integrity of targeted network security and to exploit weaknesses 
within the system. One of Infiltrator’s greatest strengths would lie in its ability 
to communicate with Sentinel. Upon request by Infiltrator, Sentinel would 
share all or part of its catalog of defense strategies for Infiltrator to analyze. 
Sentinel could share weaknesses it identified in its own defense strategies, giv-
ing Infiltrator options to explore when faced with such a defensive tactic. Sen-
tinel could also share attack strategies it has encountered, allowing Infiltrator 
to replicate, implement, and augment them. In turn, Infiltrator would share its 
attack catalog with Sentinel, allowing Sentinel to shore up its own defenses 
where Infiltrator has identified weaknesses. 
Once inside a targeted system Infiltrator would behave similarly to Sentinel, 
only without the consent of the system owner or operator. Infiltrator might hide 
its own perceptrons in the systems it invades, increasing its processing power 
by creating covert artificial neural networks. The NSA has already deployed a 
similar program, although it appears to be heavily reliant on handler direc-
tion.128 Across a large network of targeted systems, Infiltrator’s processing 
speed and power would increase exponentially. Infiltrator would need to be 
cautious in this environment so as to avoid detection. This would likely require 
Infiltrator to spread itself out thinly across a greater network to avoid consum-
ing suspicious amounts of processing power from its host system. Infiltrator 
could also possess a regenerative capacity. If Infiltrator was discovered on a 
system and purged save for one hidden component, it would be able to rebuild 
itself from that single remaining component. It may also be programmed with, 
or learn the ability to, prevent itself from being deleted at all – NSA malware 
already possesses this ability.129 Infiltrator would benefit from the ability to 
learn from counterattacks to more effectively hide and embed its code into tar-
geted systems. 
Once Infiltrator has successfully infiltrated a system, it would then need to 
serve two functions. The first is intelligence gathering. Infiltrator would report 
back to its handlers on the information it has obtained, which would then give 
the handlers intelligence to adjust Infiltrator’s operational parameters. The in-
formation transmitted by Infiltrator would need to be heavily encrypted and 
relayed covertly to handlers. Infiltrator would learn the best ways to do this 
while benefitting from the same self-regulating encryption used by Sentinel. 
The information relayed by Infiltrator might also help Sentinel to better aug-
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ment its own defensive capabilities, allowing Sentinel to generate a response to 
future cyberattacks. 
The second function of Infiltrator would be sabotage and disruption. Infiltra-
tor would be able to receive directives from handlers on how to best dismantle 
an enemy intelligence network, but the need for handler input would diminish 
as Infiltrator learned which tactics to apply and when. Handler guidance might 
be more appropriate in delicate situations requiring specific disruption, such as 
the deletion or manipulation of data, whereas Infiltrator might be capable of 
carrying out widespread sabotage such as DOS attacks or malware-like intru-
sion on its own. Infiltrator might disrupt an enemy system by interfering with 
network connectivity, thereby preventing one system from communicating 
with another. It might corrupt enemy systems leading to loss of critical systems 
files. At the directive of handlers, it might replace critical information with 
falsified data in order to mislead enemy intelligence agencies. Sabotage and 
disruption are not limited to information. Stuxnet showed that attack programs 
are capable of causing physical damage to certain systems, and other malicious 
programs further demonstrate this power.130 Infiltrator might consume massive 
amounts of processing power to overload and destroy a computer’s hard disc 
drive, resulting in a loss of data. It might also interfere with other machine 
components operated remotely or by computer. 
As part of its partnership with Sentinel, Infiltrator could have limited civil-
ian, corporate, and law enforcement capability. In addition to keeping a cata-
logue of attempted intrusions, Sentinel might also pinpoint possible origins of 
the attacks. Law Enforcement Infiltrators would then trace such an attack back 
to its source, infiltrate the targeted network, and perform is intelligence gather-
ing and sabotage functions. However, allowing private citizens and corpora-
tions to launch Infiltrator against a target would have dangerous repercussions. 
For instance, if an isolated group of hackers in Nation A redirect their activities 
through servers in Nation B, and a Corporate Infiltrator is unleashed on the 
unwitting Nation B, the United States could face backlash for sanctioning or 
impliedly permitting unprovoked cyberattacks. Infiltrator would require more 
hands-on direction than Sentinel, and so it would be unwise to allow the aver-
age citizen or corporations to have access to such a powerful tool. This prob-
lem might be overcome by granting federal law enforcement agencies access to 
Infiltrator for the purposes of coordinating with Sentinel to eliminate cyber-
crime and cyber-terrorism threats while leaving larger-scale application to the 
handlers. 
After Infiltrator has completed an objective, it would not remove itself from 
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a targeted system. Instead, the Infiltrator neural network would remain passive 
in the system, learning and evolving its capabilities based on the efforts of oth-
er, active Infiltrators around the world. Passive Infiltrators could reactivated by 
handlers, or might be spurred to automatic reactivation by a certain set of cir-
cumstances, and would then resume intelligence gathering and sabotage func-
tions. 
Infiltrator and Sentinel are simply components of a greater power. In peace-
time they are refined and forged into powerful tools. When faced with war in 
the digital theater, these Artificial Intelligence Constructs would combine their 
efforts to ensure the safety and integrity of domestic digital systems. They 
would also lash out to stop continued assault, and render every available ave-
nue of attack inert. The combined might of Sentinel and Infiltrator would not 
merely disrupt and sabotage enemy systems – it would annihilate them. 
c. Retaliator Protocol 
As discussed earlier, the United States has only ever deployed a kinetic nu-
clear device twice – both times against the same target to effectuate the same 
result.131 This deployment was during wartime, not in response to a criminal or 
terrorist act.132 The deployment was tactical, both a means to bring an end to 
the war in the Pacific Theater and to demonstrate to all the world a new and 
terrible power.133 Also of significance is the fact that the United States did not 
strike first with their nuclear option – it was only deployed following the attack 
on Pearl Harbor.134 A digital nuclear option should adhere to similar principles 
– it should only be deployed in a time of war and even then only in response to 
foreign aggression. 
Retaliator Protocol does not refer to a distinct AI Construct. Rather, it would 
be a protocol enacted during a cyberwar scenario requiring deep integration 
between Infiltrator and Sentinel, essentially merging them into a new entity 
with a new purpose. Retaliator Protocol would be triggered either by a certain 
set of events or circumstances or at the direction of handlers, which would then 
activate restricted functions in both Sentinel and Infiltrator and task them to 
analyze the threat, prevent damage, and stop the initial attack. Once the prima-
ry threat had been neutralized, Retaliator Protocol would take the fight to the 
instigator and wreak havoc on their systems. 
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i. Retaliator Protocol: Sentinel Functionality 
Much like its peacetime application, Sentinel would be tasked with defense 
and analysis. Cyberwar has the potential to damage critical systems nation-
wide, such as power grids, and some believe catastrophic attacks of this caliber 
are not only possible, but increasingly likely.135 Using the national neural net-
work, the national Sentinel Construct would be prepared to counter a cyberwar 
effort by tapping into the collective defense catalog to coordinate counter-
intrusion strategies. Individual Sentinels from private citizens and corporate 
entities would be “drafted” to aid in the defensive effort – Retaliator Protocol 
would activate Sentinel programs across the nation without the authorization of 
private citizens or corporations.  This would vastly increase the defensive ca-
pabilities and processing power and speed of Sentinel. Critical systems would 
benefit from the peacetime experiences of individual Sentinels. Honed defen-
sive strategies and advanced self-regulating encryption would maximize coun-
ter-intrusion efforts. Communication with Infiltrator in peacetime might have 
allowed Sentinel to prepare itself for certain iterations of cyberattacks, such as 
specialized malware. System quarantine or repair and restore capabilities may 
have been adapted to more serious threats during peacetime as well. 
Sentinel’s defense in cyberwar would not stop at securing domestic systems. 
In peacetime, Infiltrator would be capable of tracing cyberattacks back to their 
sources, no matter how circuitous the route. In wartime, Infiltrator could elimi-
nate hostile presence in these access points. Infiltrator could then install Senti-
nel in these neutralized systems, allowing Sentinel to move in and secure them 
against further intrusion. Once Infiltrator had gained access to the instigator 
systems – or if Infiltrator had been reactivated in these systems – Sentinel 
would be able to join Infiltrator abroad, securing any networks holding Infiltra-
tor neural components and freeing Infiltrator to perform its own Retaliator Pro-
tocol functions, a function akin to capturing and holding territory. 
ii. Retaliator Protocol: Infiltrator Functionality 
In a Retaliator scenario, Infiltrator would be responsible for generating a 
level of destruction relatively comparable to a nuclear device detonated in cy-
berspace. Whichever event triggers the Retaliator Protocol, Sentinel and Infil-
trator would need to move swiftly to ensure both domestic security and that the 
avenues of the initial attack are disabled. This would require a response time 
far beyond what human handlers could manage. This first Retaliator stage 
would be automated, without human oversight. Once completed, Retaliator 
Protocol would move to a standby mode to await input from handlers. In this 
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way, an automated system would not be able to wage an independent war 
against a foreign nation without human approval. A standby mode would allow 
the President and Congress to determine the appropriateness of proceeding to 
cyberwar, or if the situation should be de-escalated. 
In the event of cyberwar, handler input is vital and allows for humans to 
designate specific targets. Depending on how long the cyber conflict lasts, In-
filtrator might learn strategies on its own, and be able to implement them as its 
analysis of battlefield conditions evolves. Infiltrator’s intelligent intrusion 
methods and cooperation with the wartime Sentinel would open up a wide ar-
ray of targets that might be inaccessible in kinetic warfare. The physical dam-
age done by overloading computer systems would shut down avenues of for-
eign cyberattacks. Flooding systems with Infiltrator neural processing compo-
nents or junk code could have the same effect by consuming processing power 
from critical functions while greatly increasing Infiltrator’s power. It could 
also erase data from any and all systems in which it has taken root, freeing up 
even more processing power while destroying information. Inside a foreign 
military network, Infiltrator could interfere or completely disable communica-
tions. Any automated or computer-assisted functions could be disabled, greatly 
reducing military effectiveness. Infiltrator could work its way into targeted 
civilian computer networks and permanently disable power grids, air traffic 
control, water treatment plants, and other critical systems across the country. 
The objective of Infiltrator in a Retaliator scenario would be permanently disa-
bling or destroying computer systems in the hostile nation. 
Infiltrator would have the ability to generate kinetic results as well, and this 
outcome only becomes more plausible with the advent of such technology as 
self-driving cars and civilian sector drones. As for existing automated technol-
ogy, satellites orbiting in space are dependent upon remote communication 
from a computer.136 Not only would Infiltrator be capable of commandeering 
satellites for intelligence gathering purposes, but hijacking satellite maneuver-
ing ability could lead to catastrophic kinetic results. Once in control of an en-
emy satellite, Infiltrator could set its orbit to terminate on a high value target, 
such as a military installation or an aircraft carrier. Such an outcome might be 
more easily achieved by infiltrating weapon systems on hostile military drones 
or warships and using the enemy’s own weapons against them. In all likeli-
hood, launch codes for a targeted nation’s nuclear arsenal would not be beyond 
the reach of Retaliator Protocol. More complex maneuvers and those with 
long-lasting consequences would almost certainly require the guidance of a 
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handler. 
The kinetic destruction would not necessarily be an integral part of the Re-
taliator Protocol; it would most likely be left to the discretion of Infiltrator 
handlers, the President, Congress, and military advisors. Even without kinetic 
damage, the result of the Retaliator Protocol would be rapid and total destruc-
tion of the computer network of a hostile country. Military computer networks 
would be either burned out from forced overclocking or flooded with junk 
code to consume processing power by Infiltrator requiring, at a minimum, 
complete system overhaul. In the private sector, if such targets are designated, 
power grids and computer systems could be permanently shut down. Banking 
and financial records could be wiped and the systems rendered useless, which 
might lead to an economic collapse. Above all, communication networks with-
in the country would be left in disarray. Infiltrator might be programmed with 
or evolve the capacity to commandeer cellphone and radio towers and produce 
jamming signals. 
Retaliator Protocol would be devastating against a technology-dependent 
target nation. Critical infrastructure would be crippled, perhaps irreparably so 
without obscenely expensive overhauls. Lives would inevitably be lost. Infil-
tration, data mining, counter-intelligence, sabotage, and other complex tasks 
could be accomplished within a matter of weeks, days, or even hours depend-
ing on the response time from human handlers.   
iii. Retaliator Protocol: Aftermath 
The digital systems and networks of the targeted nation would be left unusa-
ble, either by physically damaging them or filling them with un-erasable junk 
code and malicious programs. While the image would not be as visceral as a 
smoldering mushroom cloud looming miles into the sky over scorched earth, 
the aftermath would be strongly felt in a different way. Any machinery operat-
ed by a computer would be either useless without a complete overhaul, or still 
operable but with severely limited functionality. Internet access might be se-
verely limited, or cut off entirely. Telephones and cellphones might be incapa-
ble of making calls.  Bank records and accounts could be wiped. Without 
working communications networks, the targeted government would be unable 
to prevent society from falling into disorder and chaos. The targeted military 
would face similar problems with communications blackouts and compromised 
infrastructure. 
The devastation wrought upon the targeted nation, with or without resulting 
kinetic damage, would stop the cyberattack and prevent the possibility of a 
coordinated kinetic response. It would dissuade them from trying again. And, 
perhaps most importantly, it would let other cyber-capable nations know of the 
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existence of a new superweapon – one capable of bringing a sovereign nation 
to its knees without firing a single shot. 
IV. Sentinel and Infiltrator Classification 
As powerful as the proposed Sentinel and Infiltrator Constructs could be, 
they would not need to rise to a level beyond an Artificially Narrow Intelli-
gence. Both Constructs would be restricted in functionality by the limitations 
in their programming, even though their programming would enable them both 
to learn, as well as a significant degree of freedom in self-enhancement. How-
ever, both Constructs would only be able to learn and enhance themselves in 
limited ways. 
For example, Sentinel might possess the ability to learn, but it would only 
learn better ways to protect itself from outside threats to systems it is designat-
ed to protect. Sentinel would be programmed to allow handler access, and 
would be prevented from augmenting itself in such a way as to deny such ac-
cess. Infiltrator could be programmed with the same limitations, allowing han-
dlers to have unfettered access to both Constructs’ core programming. Infiltra-
tor could also be programmed with a sophisticated friend-or-foe identification 
system, preventing it from spreading into and disrupting networks designated 
as friendly. 
What would also place these Constructs in the ANI category is their inability 
to think or behave humanly. Sentinel and Infiltrator would be responding to 
stimuli or handler direction in peacetime and wartime scenarios, with their re-
sponses dictated by their programming. At no point would Sentinel be able to 
change a user’s desktop background because it prefers blue over green. Like-
wise, Infiltrator would not be able to launch a Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attack against a Planned Parenthood clinic because it believes abortion 
is murder. Instead, these programs would think and behave rationally based on 
the limitations of their programming or in response to stimuli which then trig-
gers a preprogrammed or learned response. That is not to say there are no dan-
gers inherent in the use and application of ANI, and in fact they may pose the 
most serious danger to modern global cybersecurity. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DIGITAL FRONTIER 
The implementation of Artificial Intelligence on such a scale as the pro-
posed Sentinel and Infiltrator programs has never been done before. It will 
likely be a very long time before any such project sees widespread application, 
if one ever does. While this concept remains largely in the realm of imagina-
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tion, it is helpful to consider how the international community might respond 
to such a significant event.  Although we cannot examine similar responses 
from the international community regarding this particular subject matter, it 
can be instructive to examine how the world leaders of the past approached and 
resolved international issues that generated similar concerns. Volumes of work 
can be – and have been – dedicated to exploring the existential and metaphysi-
cal implications of AI. This section of this article will instead focus more spe-
cifically on the international legal implications of using artificial intelligence 
as a weapon of mass destruction in cyberspace. 
I. International Efforts to Reduce Unnecessary Suffering in War 
a. Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868 
In 1863, Russia successfully developed a musket ball capable of detonating 
upon impact with hard targets.137 The intended purpose of this weapon was to 
allow infantry to destroy the supplies and ammunition of hostile forces.138 The 
success of this new weapon spurred further research and development into the 
technology until, in 1867, the exploding musket ball was refined into an anti-
personnel weapon capable of detonating upon impact with the softer masses of 
enemy soldiers.139 
19th-century Russia’s government was unwilling to implement this new 
technology in wartime scenarios, and sought the cooperation of the interna-
tional community to prohibit the use of this and similar weapons from the thea-
ter of war.140 In 1868, the Imperial Cabinet of Russia met with world leaders at 
Saint Petersburg in the Russian Empire to formally agree to the prohibition in 
what would become known as the Saint Petersburg Declaration, or the Decla-
ration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 
400 Grammes Weight.141 Signatories to the declaration included the United 
Kingdom, Italy, France, and Switzerland.142 The nations of Brazil, Estonia, and 
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Baden, not in attendance at the signing of the declaration in Saint Petersburg, 
later ratified it.143 
To paraphrase, the Saint Petersburg Declaration set forth the following: it is 
the responsibility of the international community to lessen the effects of war, 
the objective of which should be to weaken the strength of the hostile military 
force.144 While disabling enemy soldiers is an acceptable means to achieve that 
objective, it is not acceptable to compound the suffering of enemy soldiers.145 
To that end, a weapon of this sort – explosive anti-personnel ordnance – is 
“contrary to the laws of humanity.”146 
The Saint Petersburg Declaration was the first international agreement of its 
kind, specifically prohibiting the use of certain types of weapons during war.147 
Although the international community of the nineteenth century was very dif-
ferent from today’s complex realm of international relations, it is still instruc-
tive to consider this swift response to a developing weapon technology on the 
global stage. Within one year of successfully developing the anti-personnel 
variant of the exploding musket ball, the Russian government moved to elimi-
nate its use in war.148 Major European world powers assented to this prohibition 
before the anti-personnel variant could ever see actual use in a wartime scenar-
io.149 The Saint Petersburg Declaration demonstrated the ability of world pow-
ers to come together and address a known entity; in this instance, the unneces-
sary aggravation of human suffering during war. 
b. The Geneva Protocol 
The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poison-
ous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, or the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925, is an international treaty created to bind its signatories in 
agreement against using chemical or biological weapons in times of war.150 The 
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Geneva Protocol reaffirmed the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which prohibited 
the use of chemical weapons, and forbade Germany from manufacturing and 
importing them.151 It also upheld Article 5 of the Treaty relating to the Use of 
Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, also known as the 1922 Treaty of 
Washington, which never entered into force.152 The Geneva Protocol contains 
specific language from both the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Wash-
ington, which was subsequently modified in the Geneva Protocol and reads in 
part, “Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of 
all analogous liquids materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the 
general opinion of the civilized world[.]”153 
World War I demonstrated the terrible power of chemical weaponry. Gas at-
tacks accounted for 30% of military casualties during the war.154 Death by gas-
based weaponry was slow and painful, and many survivors carried physical 
and psychological scars throughout their lives.155 Chemical warfare in World 
War I also claimed the lives of many civilians, who were largely unprotected 
when winds carried the harmful chemical agents off the battlefields and into 
civilian homes.156 The rationale of the Saint Petersburg Declaration can be seen 
as an underlying current influencing the Geneva Protocol, its predecessors, and 
subsequent international treaties which prohibited the proliferation of certain 
types of weapons. 
II. International Humanitarian Law 
As previously mentioned, the objective of war should be to weaken the 
strength of the hostile military force.157 While disabling enemy soldiers is an 
acceptable means to achieve that objective, it is not acceptable to compound 
their suffering. Deploying a weapon system that is difficult, if not impossible 
to effectively control, and which can cause unnecessary suffering in both hos-
tile forces and civilians alike is certainly contrary to the laws of humanity. 
a. The Hague Conventions 
In 1899 world leaders gathered in The Hague in the Netherlands, summoned 
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https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2376985/pdf/0980611.pdf. 
 155 Id. at 620-21. 
 156 Id. at 616. 
 157 St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 141. 
128 THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY  [Vol. 25.1 
 JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY  
 
by Tsar Nicholas II of Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, to participate in the 
first Hague Convention, or the Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land.158 The 1899 Hague Convention was successful in 
setting forth conventions to govern the laws of war on land and sea, and was 
ratified by several major world powers, including the United States.159 There 
are many provisions to the 1899 Hague Convention but of note are Articles 22 
and 23 of the Annex to the Convention.160 Article 22 explicitly states that the 
“right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”161 
Article 23 provides some clarification, prohibiting “arms, projectiles, or mate-
rial of a nature to cause superfluous injury.”162 The language of these articles 
expresses the intent of the signatories to prohibit weapons of a similar type 
specifically enumerated in the accompanying three Declarations. One Declara-
tion prohibited deploying explosives from balloons.163 A second prohibited the 
use of projectiles designed to disperse asphyxiating gases.164 Finally, a third 
Declaration prohibited the use of dum dums, or projectiles which change shape 
inside the human body.165 
Both the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 
1907 represent significant steps taken by the international community to codify 
international humanitarian law. One of the notable focuses of both these con-
ventions was a desire by a majority of the signatories to minimize human suf-
fering on the battlefield.166 These conventions were designed with military per-
sonnel in mind, and did not give much consideration to the safety or wellbeing 
of civilians in war. The need for civilian protection, and more comprehensive 
regulation on the conduct of war, would be addressed at length during the Ge-
neva Conventions and their accompanying Protocols following World War II. 
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b. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols 
The conventions, protocols, and treaties discussed above share a common 
theme. While the stated objective can be boiled down to reducing unnecessary 
human suffering during war, these international agreements have been chiefly 
concerned with lessening the suffering of combatants. Until the Geneva Con-
vention, civilian casualties had not been given significant consideration. The 
Geneva Convention – specifically, the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Pro-
tocol I – addresses the necessity to safeguard the lives and wellbeing of civilian 
populations involved in wartime hostilities.167 
i. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War of August 12, 1949 (The Fourth Geneva Convention) 
The First and Second Geneva Conventions provide for the care of wounded 
and sick members of hostile armies and navies.168 The Third Geneva Conven-
tion provides for the care of prisoners of war.169 The Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion’s provisions focus on ensuring the protection and humane treatment of 
civilian populations during wartime hostilities.170 The Fourth Convention’s Ar-
ticles share the common theme of lessening unnecessary human suffering; for 
example, Articles 13 forbids murder, torture, and brutality.171 Articles 33 and 
34 forbid pillaging, reprisals, and indiscriminate destruction of property.172 
Convention IV goes further in requiring occupying forces to protect civilian 
hospitals (Article 18),173 respect local and religious customs (Article 27),174 and 
allowing public officials of occupied territory to continue their duties (Article 
64).175 
The Fourth Geneva Convention goes a step beyond avoiding unnecessary 
human suffering as a result of hostilities in war; it requires occupying forces to 
maintain healthy and safe environments for civilians to the extent possible.176 
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This could pose a significant obstacle to the implementation of a CWMD. In 
the modern age, nations that make use of computer technology and the Internet 
have developed a dependency on this technology. Cyber-attacks targeted at 
civilian communications and Internet access might be seen as violations of the 
Articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Articles 79 through 135 require 
generally that civilians be permitted to live their lives without interference, 
unless security concerns require otherwise.177 If such security concerns do ex-
ist, internment under humane conditions is acceptable.178 However, in a 
cyberwar scenario there is no need for a physical military occupation in a tar-
geted nation and thus no need for direct interference with civilian lives. With 
computer technology being such an integral component to the people of tech-
savvy nations, a significant or total obstruction to those citizens’ ability to use 
their technology without the requisite security concerns would violate the rele-
vant Articles. 
ii. Protocol I 
Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I) expanded the protections established for civilians and aid workers in interna-
tional conflicts.179 Here exist several provisions that have prohibitions that 
could directly obstruct the application of a CWMD during a wartime scenario. 
Of note, Articles 51 and 54 prohibit indiscriminate attacks on civilians and 
sources of food and water.180 Water treatment facilities have seen a recent trend 
towards automation, making them viable targets for cyber-threat actors.181 The 
same is true of food processing industries.182 Articles 51 and 54 also prohibit 
the destruction of “other materials needed for survival.”183 One could make the 
argument that this could include power plants and oil pipelines in the 21st cen-
tury.184 
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Article 56 prohibits attacks on nuclear generating stations and dams.185 Stux-
net proves that even facilities dealing in the processing of nuclear materials are 
not immune to cyber-attacks.186 It stands to reason that dams are similarly vul-
nerable. A cyber-attack of sufficient sophistication designed to destabilize a 
facility of this kind could, in theory, have the same disastrous effects as the oil 
pipeline attack, but with a categorically higher potential to inflict harm. 
Article 35 of Protocol I is also worth mentioning.187 It prohibits the use of 
weapons that “cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering” and prohibits 
“means of warfare that cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the 
natural environment.”188 This would likely include such weaponry as the anti-
personnel exploding musket ball outlawed by the Saint Petersburg Declaration. 
It can also easily apply to kinetic weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear weap-
ons have the power to cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, and 
they inflict the long-lasting environmental damage also prohibited in Article 
35. 
An artificially intelligent weapon system could conceivably inflict this same 
kind of damage by manipulating the control systems for nuclear weapons, but 
the AI itself – as intangible code in cyberspace – would be incapable of inflict-
ing the prohibited harms directly. It could also be directed to avoid inflicting 
the prohibited harms, or even directed to avoid harming civilians in any in-
stance. This creates a grey area in the established law. Weapons that do inflict 
the prohibited harms are, themselves, prohibited. It would be prudent to ad-
dress whether the same restrictions should apply to weapons that can inflict the 
prohibited harms, but can be directed not to do so. 
iii. Restrictions on Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Implementation of 19th-century Russia’s anti-personnel application of the 
exploding musket ball technology may very well have been contrary to the 
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laws of humanity, but firearms and their ordnance typically fall below the 
threshold to be categorized as weapons of mass destruction. 50 U.S.C. §2302 
defines weapons of mass destruction as “any weapon or device that is intended, 
or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant 
number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of – (A) toxic 
or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (B) a disease organism; or (C) ra-
diation or radioactivity.”189 
The nuclear bombs dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima during World War 
II are two examples of weapons of mass destruction which utilized radiation.190 
Chemical and biological WMDs have also seen use throughout recent history. 
As early as the 1760’s, British military officers in Colonial America used blan-
kets infected with smallpox virus – disease organisms – to “extirpate” Native 
American populations.191 And during World War I, chemical warfare was fairly 
commonplace with both Allied and Central Forces. Chlorine, phosgene, and 
tear-gas were used to great effect, and the United Kingdom even began devel-
oping an arsenic-based chemical weapon called the M Device before the war’s 
end.192 The proliferation of these devastating weapons has naturally been met 
with resistance, and world leaders have come together numerous times to ad-
dress concerns over the continued use of weapons of mass destruction.193 
III. Legality of Nuclear Weapons and Non-Proliferation 
August 6th and August 9th, 1945, are the only two dates in the history of hu-
mankind where nuclear weapons have been utilized in armed, international 
conflict.194 The international community has continuously debated the use of 
nuclear weapons ever since. The raw power nuclear weapons unleash, com-
bined with the long-lasting and deleterious effects of nuclear radiation on hu-
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mans and the environment, make them a hotly contested subject.195  Almost 
immediately after the United States deployed their nuclear weapons against 
Japan, the United Nations called for a full stop on the further development and 
use of nuclear weapons.196 No such agreement has been achieved by the totality 
of the international community, but nuclear and non-nuclear nations alike con-
tinue to participate in the ongoing discussion.197 
a. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968) 
The 1960’s saw enough development in nuclear weapons and power tech-
nology to spur the international community to take action. For a time this tech-
nology was exclusively available to the global superpowers; the U.S.A., the 
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, as well as France and the Peoples’ Repub-
lic of China.198 This exclusivity would be short-lived. The processes used to 
generate nuclear power circulated in academic journals, and the materials re-
quired for the process became cheaper.199 Eventually even unstable and devel-
oping nations were able to develop this technology on their own.200 By the end 
of the decade, enough nations either had developed or possessed the capability 
to develop nuclear weapons to give cause for concern.201 As between the five 
superpowers, nuclear weapons acted as a sufficient deterrent by means of the 
doctrine of mutually assured destruction.202 However, the doctrine of deterrence 
only works when the parties in conflict both have access to nuclear weapons 
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systems; the doctrine is compromised when many smaller nations with “vola-
tile border disputes” possess the same technology.203 
1n 1968, members of the United Nations signed the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and it entered into force in 1970.204 Nuclear 
powers and non-powers alike agreed to its provisions.205 Although it contains 
eleven Articles, the objectives of the treaty can be distilled into three pillars. 
The first pillar establishes the non-proliferation objective through Articles I, II, 
and III.206 It prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons and technology by nucle-
ar-capable states. This first pillar also prohibits non-nuclear states from receiv-
ing or developing nuclear weapons and technology.207 The second pillar estab-
lishes the objective of promoting peaceful uses for nuclear technology through 
Article IV.208 This pillar promotes the development of nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes and encourages international cooperation to that effect.209 
The third pillar encourages the disarmament objective through Article VI; it 
requires its signatories to work in good faith towards ending the nuclear arms 
race and striving for disarmament.210 
The treaty was initially designed to remain in effect for twenty-five years, 
but it was extended indefinitely in 1995.211 The number of nations who agree to 
be bound by this treaty has grown from 43 at the time it entered into force, to 
nearly 190, and it is “the most widely adhered to nonproliferation or arms con-
trol agreement in history.”212 As such, it has been largely successful in achiev-
ing its nonproliferation objectives and in maintaining global security. 213 
It is not, however, a perfect solution. Several obstacles highlight how some 
threats can slip through the cracks. One of the most significant obstacles is out-
right non-compliance. While this is a problem faced by most regulations, the 
stakes are decidedly higher when the regulation is a nuclear non-proliferation 
treaty as opposed to regulations on, for example, withholding employee in-
come tax. Some well-known nations who have or continue to disregard the 
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treaty’s objectives are Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.214 Article X of the treaty 
allows for signatories to withdraw under certain circumstances.215 Abuse of this 
withdrawal clause also presents compliance concerns. For instance, a signatory 
that is already in violation of the treaty might abuse the withdrawal clause to 
avoid sanctions.216 This clause might also allow a compliant signatory to with-
draw from the treaty and still remain in possession of otherwise-prohibited 
nuclear materials.217 
b. International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provides very useful guidance in the 
development of nuclear technology and for disarming nuclear weapons. While 
it does prohibit certain uses and applications of nuclear technology, the lan-
guage of the NPT avoids directly addressing the issue of whether or not the 
possession, use, and threat of using nuclear weapons is legal. In 1996, the In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ) released an advisory opinion to address this 
vital concern. 
c. International Law and Cyberspace 
The international laws of war advance several critical humanitarian objec-
tives.218 Such objectives include the reduction of suffering of combatants and 
the protection of civilians in the theater of war. Another is halting the prolifera-
tion and prohibiting the use of weapons that cause unnecessarily severe dam-
age to the environment and injury to combatants and civilians. There are other 
critical objectives advanced by the international law of war, but for the purpos-
es of this discussion, the two described above provide an adequate framing 
device to analyze the issue of weapons of mass destruction in cyberspace. 
i. On Cyberwar 
Presently there is no cyberspace equivalent to the Geneva or Hague Conven-
tions, or the Saint Petersburg Declaration. The international community has 
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come together to address cybercrime and while there has been no shortage of 
scurrilous cyberspace activity to warrant such attention in recent years, 
cyberwar does not appear to have generated the same volume of concern.219 
The existing law of war evolved around traditional, kinetic warfare and will 
not always perfectly govern cyberspace, but application of existing law com-
bined with developing international custom can provide valuable guidance. 
Earlier in this article, war was considered generally to be the sum of actions 
taken by one sovereign nation against another with the intent to undermine the 
integrity of the targeted sovereign.220 War as a legal concept does not have one 
all-encompassing definition, but guidance from multiple legal bodies provides 
that war may be “associated with a State’s use of force to vindicate its rights … 
under international law.”221 Although the United Nations Charter prohibits the 
threat or use of force in instances of aggression, use of force is authorized in 
other scenarios such as self-defense.222 However, in effectuating a self-defense 
response, the principles of necessity and proportionality remain in effect.223 
As for war in cyberspace, some have argued that there can be no such 
thing.224 Thomas Rid, a professor and scholar on international law and war, and 
his supporters argue that harmful actions in cyberspace alone amount to sabo-
tage, albeit efficient and aggressive sabotage, but not grievous enough to rise 
to the level of war.225 However, if a cyber-attack that results in physical proper-
ty damage that leads to loss of life would be an exception to this rule and rise 
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to the level of an act of war in the view of cyberwar skeptics.226 This view is 
not without merit; the law of war has evolved alongside the traditional, kinetic 
theater of war for centuries. Opponents to the notion of cyberwar advise cau-
tion before officially pursuing cyberspace as the newest theater of war in 
which to conduct offensive operations.227 As recent cyberattacks have demon-
strated, the integrity of existing defensive and security measures is wanting, 
and focusing on offensive strategies at the expense of shoring up domestic de-
fenses continues to leave those systems vulnerable.228 
Detractors to the idea of cyberwar present legitimate reasons to reexamine 
the current push towards offensive cyber-operations, particularly when defense 
and security are sacrificed or neglected in favor of offensive capabilities.229 
However, the detractor argument is rooted in traditional, kinetic views on war-
fare. Such maxims as “code can’t explode” are technically correct, but to 
downplay the significance of hostile cyber-operations sets a dangerous prece-
dent.230 Technology continues to advance at a sometimes startling rate. More 
and more features of everyday life are becoming automated and networked 
together. This is true in both the civilian and military sectors, as discussed in 
the introduction.231 
Unless the progress of technology makes an abrupt about-face and sprints 
off in a direction other than developing networked and remotely-accessible 
systems and tools, technological interconnectivity will continue to touch more 
and more facets of everyday life. The potential for harm exists now, and the 
avenues through which cyberspace threat actors can inflict that harm will only 
increase with time; that is to say, even if cyberwar cannot exist in the present, 
technological advancement will make it so in the not too distant future. The 
three-pronged artificial intelligence program proposed above could address 
both the current state of cyber-defense and the growing desire for offensive 
cyber-weapons. 
Another theory advanced by Jeppe Teglskov Jacobsen argues that, while 
cyberattacks are valid and potentially dangerous, the predisposition of State 
actors is to resort to conventional, kinetic responses in the face of cyberattacks, 
thus decreasing the likelihood of an actual cyberwar scenario.232 This detraction 
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of cyberwar holds more water than Rid’s absolute rejection. It holds up par-
ticularly well in certain examples; for instance, a technologically integrated 
State would have fewer options to launch a cyberattack against a State with 
less technological sophistication, which might make conventional means more 
attractive. As between technologically sophisticated States, conducting hostili-
ties through cyberspace does become a viable option. Cyberattacks are rela-
tively inexpensive, faster, and do not require risk of harm to human soldiers, 
and the advantages of cyberwar will only grow in number as technology ad-
vances.233 
ii. On Cyber-Weapons 
In theory, an artificially intelligent weapons system could inflict massive 
casualties in both military and civilian populations, severely damage the envi-
ronment, and irreversibly compromise the integrity of a targeted State. Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law suggests that the use of such a weapons system 
would be universally condemned by the international community.234 Certainly 
the wanton and indiscriminate annihilation inflicted by this AI weapon would 
be in violation of even the most basic principles of the law of war; its use 
would never be explicitly authorized, and even its consideration would spark 
heated debate. 
In the same vein that some voices argue against the existence and possibility 
of cyberwar, some voices argue that cyber-weapons categorically cannot be 
classified as weapons of mass destruction by definition. Jeffrey Carr, CEO of 
Taia Global Inc., is one such proponent of this theory; his particular interpreta-
tion rests on the ability of cyber-weapons to directly inflict physical damage or 
injury. Carr proposes that “the potential effect of… a cyber weapon – is in di-
rect proportion to how much a given population relies upon the network that 
the weapon subverts or destroys.”235 This is an appropriate measure with which 
to gauge the efficacy of a cyber-weapon; to use an example, the temporary in-
terference a DDoS attack would create in the computer systems that control a 
dam would not be nearly as profound as the resulting catastrophe inflicted by a 
computer virus specifically designed to open the dam above a populated area. 
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In those scenarios, the DDoS attack would be an ineffective cyber-weapon be-
cause it had minimal impact on a network that is heavily relied upon, while the 
virus would be an extremely effective weapon. However, the interference 
caused by a DDoS attack on popular news website during a time of crisis 
would be extremely effective at disrupting vital communications. Another 
measure of a weapon’s effectiveness, according to Carr, is the weapon’s ability 
to directly kill or injure human beings.236 Presently, no cyber-attack is attribut-
ed with the direct death of a human being.237 This is one requirement found in 
any definition of weapons of mass destruction.238 50 U.S.C. referenced earlier 
in this section, and 18 U.S.C. referenced by Carr both define weapons of mass 
destruction: “any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious 
bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poison-
ous chemicals.”239 Under these definitions, even if a cyber-weapon played a 
part in inflicting widespread loss of life, the cyber-weapon itself would still not 
attain classification as a weapon of mass destruction because it was not the 
direct cause of harm. 
Relying on existing legal definitions and concepts is useful when dealing 
with issues that involve cyberspace, but these existing definitions and concepts 
will come up short of providing critical guidance when an issue wholly exists 
in cyberspace. Although changes to law happen slowly it does happen, and 
sometimes change happens quickly. The foundations of space law were estab-
lished just one year after the launch of Sputnik.240 Cyberspace is not dissimilar 
to outer space in the sense that it is a new frontier. Just as the international 
community has agreed to the prohibition of certain weapons systems in outer 
space, the same attitude can and should be applied to cyberspace.241 
IV. Developing International Cyber Law 
Treaties are not the only means of establishing international law. Customary 
international law, which “develops from the general and consistent practice of 
states if the practice is followed out of a sense of legal obligation,” can be as 
binding on states as any treaty.242 The foundations of a customary international 
regime on cyberspace have already begun to develop. Responses to large-scale 
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cyberattacks, perpetrated by one state against another, help set this foundation. 
Noteworthy examples include the cyberattacks allegedly launched by Russia 
against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008.243 Also in 2008, a computer worm 
dubbed “agent.btz” infiltrated the computer systems of the Department of De-
fense and was designed to transfer classified information to foreign comput-
ers.244 In 2010, a cyberattack launched by Chinese hackers pilfered intellectual 
property from Google and compromised user G-Mail accounts.245 The Stuxnet 
incident is another example.246 
While the cyberattacks themselves are the problem, customary international 
law is borne through the responses to such actions. Oddly enough, there has 
been a “lack of protest from nations whose systems have been degraded in 
some way by obnoxious cyber activity.”247 A lack of protest to these actions 
creates a permissive regime under customary international law. The same can 
be said of espionage. While individual states have laws against spying, “there 
is no international law prohibiting espionage or insisting it violates sovereign-
ty.”248 Even with strict laws prohibiting spying, many nations still conduct es-
pionage despite the risks, which has in turn created a permissive regime within 
the international community. This is not to say that espionage is considered 
legal activity, but the permissive regime does not take action against such ac-
tivities either.249 The same appears to be true of cyber-operations. 
Although little is prohibited in a permissive regime, the developing custom-
ary cyberspace law is controlled by certain existing principles. Aggressive 
cyberattacks designed to cause kinetic damage are “covered by the law regard-
ing the use of force and armed attack.”250 While not necessarily rising to the 
level of use of force, cyberattacks designed to compromise the integrity of nu-
clear control systems would also likely be prohibited under customary interna-
tional law given the large body of law aimed at nonproliferation and disarma-
ment.251 Due to the interconnectivity of the global economy, and the indiscrim-
inate harm such a collapse would generate, cyberattacks launched against one 
nation’s financial system would also likely be prohibited under customary in-
ternational law.252 
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This permissive regime is further guided by existing principles of interna-
tional law. In the context of wartime scenarios, “the logical approach is to take 
what guidance exists to govern more conventional warfare and determine 
whether it can be applied to cyberspace activities.”253 In 2012, Harold Koh de-
livered remarks to the USCYBERCOM on how international law already con-
trolled certain cyberspace activities.254 Koh explained that cyberattacks could 
constitute a use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and that a state’s 
right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter could be triggered by a 
cyberattack.255 Koh also discussed issues with attribution, proportionality and 
necessity when responding to cyberattacks.256 Attribution is critical to the de-
veloping customary international law on this matter because, if a cyberattack 
cannot be attributed to a nation and is instead attributed to a terrorist organiza-
tion or gang not connected to or acting as a proxy of another nation, the perpe-
trated acts and state response have no precedential value for customary law.257 
V. International Law and Artificial Intelligence 
This article has discussed the theoretical capabilities of an artificially intelli-
gent weapons system capable of learning and acting without direct input from 
a human operator. The damage such a weapons system could generate could 
potentially rival the damage inflicted by the detonation of a nuclear bomb, if 
not surpass it. Given the extensive body of law that aims for the non-
proliferation and dismantling of these kinds of weapons, one might ask why an 
artificially intelligent weapons system should even be considered at all. It 
stands to reason that a CWMD would immediately run afoul of existing inter-
national legal principles, and would probably lead to the creation of new law 
specifically forbidding their use or development. 
As we have seen, legal principles exist that can safely govern certain aspects 
of cyberspace today. But these same principles may not provide suitable guid-
ance in the future as technology continues to rapidly evolve. Existing legal 
principles are grounded in the physical world and, when it comes to war, the 
law has thus far evolved around traditional, kinetic warfare. Cyberspace is dif-
ferent than the physical world. In some instances it makes sense and is useful 
to apply existing legal regimes to cyberspace. But cyberspace opens a universe 
of new possibilities, and those possibilities grow in number and complexity 
with each technological leap forward. 
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Cyberspace experts appear to agree that a cyberattack of sufficient sophisti-
cation and scale can lead to a loss of lives, and that such an attack is likely to 
happen in the not-too-distant future.258 Because cyberspace is fundamentally 
different from the physical world we inhabit, the approach to cyber-weapons 
should take those differences into consideration. The law does change. That 
change can come from trying cases in court, legislative review, or international 
customs. The law governing war, and legal principles that are currently used to 
govern cyberspace are not immune to this change, nor should they be. Existing 
principles can serve as guidance in the creation of new legal principles to gov-
ern actions and weapons in cyberspace. 
The existing international humanitarian law and treaties regulating weapons 
and conduct in war provide guidance on how a CWMD could be handled. A 
CWMD cannot be used aggressively without reason, and in accordance with 
self-defense it must respect the principles of proportionality and necessity. One 
major advantage of a CWMD is the ability to control and direct otherwise in-
discriminate harm. Some of the scenarios provided earlier in this article de-
scribe potential widespread damage an AI weapons system could inflict on a 
civilian population. Unlike conventional WMDs, a CWMD would not only 
inflict indiscriminate harm in contravention of international humanitarian law. 
A CWMD could be designed to, or instructed to exclusively target military 
objectives, even going so far as to minimize enemy military casualties. An AI 
such as Infiltrator or Sentinel could even be tasked with improving civilian 
network infrastructure to the extent possible for the purpose of securing civil-
ian access to vital information and communications. Perhaps most significant-
ly, when military objectives are achieved by means of devastating weapons 
such as bombs and missiles, the damage and injury can linger for years. With a 
CWMD, once the military objectives are achieved, the weapon could simply be 
turned off. 
DANGERS AND NECESSITY OF ARTIFICIALLY INTELLIGENT 
CYBER-WEAPONS 
I. Speed of Technological Advancement 
Moore’s Law is a theory that describes the rate of technological advance-
ment. It generally states that the rate of advancement will increase exponential-
ly over time, while that exponential growth factor will depend upon the indus-
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try.259 The technology of various industries develops according to demand.260 
This can be seen in practice in communications; telephones have advanced 
from fixed, corded models to wireless devices capable of performing a multi-
tude of tasks in just over a decade.261 Some industries see faster advancement 
than others, and computer technology sees the most rapid advancement of any 
industry.262 
Cyber-threat actors are taking advantage of this evolution. The increasing 
sophistication of technological tools enables more dangerous cyberattacks, and 
allows cyber-threat actors to inflict increasingly greater damage. Logic would 
suggest that technological evolution should create a level playing field, since 
both cyber-threat actors and their victims are afforded essentially the same 
technology. That does not appear to be the reality. While the physical hardware 
is widely available to both sides of the cyber-threat issue, cyber-threat actors 
continually develop new methods to bypass government and corporate defen-
sive measures in what is referred to as the innovation gap.263 Insidious innova-
tions are not necessarily required to bypass existing cyber defenses. New tech-
nology can offer avenues for infiltration by cyber-threat actors by simply creat-
ing new opportunities for access.264 
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As social media continues to develop, and more personal information is used 
in online transactions, cyber-threat actors have developed avenues of infiltra-
tion that negate almost every possible counter-intrusion measure.265 The use of 
botnets allows external parties to gain control of a computer to use for their 
own purposes, usually for financial gain.266 Ransomware and crypto-locker 
programs allow an external party to lockdown or encrypt the systems of anoth-
er network, and the encryption keys can be held for ransom or blackmail pur-
poses.267 While most of these actions revolve around financial profiteering, it is 
not hard to imagine similar tactics being used against military networks or oth-
er networks that control vital civilian infrastructure. A response is needed that 
can do more than keep up with the rising frequency and sophistication of 
cyberattacks. AI may present a solution that can swiftly and intelligently re-
spond to sophisticated cyberattacks.268 
a. AI Development 
AI has also seen great development in a relatively short span of time. There 
have even been vast improvements made since this article was started just over 
one year ago. IBM’s Watson has seen application in the medical field to assist 
in cancer treatment.269  Recently, Watson has been tasked with matching cancer 
patients with clinical trials. “It’s hoped that the technology will boost the num-
ber of patients given access to cutting edge treatments, as currently, many eli-
gible patients miss out on trial opportunities.”270 Meanwhile, Berg, a U.S. bio-
tech company, has also used artificial intelligence to help to assist in develop-
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ing treatments for cancer.271 The response suggested by the AI was a new drug 
– BPM31510, “which tries to reverse the Warburg effect - the phenomenon in 
which cancerous cells change their energy supply.272 After early clinical trials, 
data from 85 patients showed signs the approach could kill tumors.273 
The legal profession has also recently seen a promising early application of 
artificial intelligence. A program developed by IBM called ROSS is capable of 
translating complex legal concepts into ‘plain English,’ which it accomplishes 
by reading through the entire body of law and returning a cited answer and top-
ical readings from legislation, case law and secondary sources.274 Ross also 
minimizes the time it takes to narrow down results from a thousand to only the 
most highly relevant answers.275 In addition, it keeps up-to-date with develop-
ments in the legal system, specifically those that may affect attorneys’ cases.276 
A technology company called Cylance is already using AI to defend against 
cyberattacks.277 Dubbed CylanceProtect, the AI is designed to: 
[extract] millions of unique characteristics from the code [of a file] and [analyze] 
them against trained statistical models to determine their intention. Rather than re-
lying on hash comparison or post-run behavior heuristics to determine what to do, 
Cylance evaluates objects in less than 100 milliseconds, early in the run time pro-
cess. That way, if the object is determined to be malicious, execution can be 
stopped.278 
CylanceProtect can protect against a diverse array of malicious programs, 
including “spear phishing, zero-day malware, privilege escalations, scripts, and 
malicious programs…, and eliminates the need for antivirus and intrusion de-
tection and prevention systems.”279 
In addition to the MarIO program described in the introduction, Google’s 
DeepMind AI has recently completed the notoriously challenging Atari game, 
Montezuma’s Revenge, by using a digital analogue of incentive.280 AI has also 
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been recently tasked with screen-writing and playing board games like Chess 
and Go against globally ranked professionals.281 Admittedly, artificial intelli-
gence has fared better in some of these pursuits than others.282  While these 
developments are very promising, the activities performed and challenges 
solved by the artificial intelligence typically involve clear, stable rules, so that 
the outcome can, with varying degrees of accuracy, be predicted, often rela-
tively early in the game. Regardless, this research will enable future artificial 
intelligences to accomplish more complex tasks and make significant contribu-
tions to human civilization. However, this progress may come at a price. 
i. Dangers and Solutions 
Some popular names in the fields of Science, Technology, Engineering, and 
Mathematics (STEM) have made various ominous claims regarding AI re-
search. These names include the world-renowned astrophysicist Stephen 
Hawking, and Elon Musk of SpaceX and Tesla fame.283 Some of their com-
ments warn of catastrophe, war, and human extinction at the cold, metal hands 
of our own creations.284 Unless these men, and others like them who make 
similar claims, know something the rest of us don’t about artificial intelligence, 
this rhetoric is purely speculative and no more based in reality than HAL or 
Ultron. While the research on artificial intelligence has shown a promising fu-
ture, the examples of AI we see today still act in accordance with program-
ming; no actions performed by modern artificial intelligence today can be at-
tributed to a cognitive process resembling human thought.285 That being said, 
there are dangers associated with the use or misuse of any technology. AI is no 
exception, and it can still pose dangers to the integrity of cyberspace. 
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1. Runaway Train 
There are already some examples of malicious computer code spreading 
throughout the internet, presumably beyond the control of its creators and out-
side the original scope of the programs. Stuxnet is perhaps the most notorious 
example. A brief examination of Stuxnet’s origins and capabilities was men-
tioned in the introduction.286 After its original objective had, presumably, been 
achieved, Stuxnet managed to spread beyond the Iranian nuclear facilities at 
Natanz and would go onto infect thousands of computers in over one hundred 
countries.287 Stuxnet’s unexpected proliferation is believed to have been the 
result of an error in the malware’s operating code.288 Stuxnet was designed to 
spread through USB devices and, while this method allowed it to successfully 
infect its targets, the coding error also allowed Stuxnet to jump back out of the 
isolated Iranian system via USB drive and onto a computer connected to the 
Internet where it spread unchecked.289 The version of Stuxnet discovered in the 
wild only targeted computers running software developed by a German com-
pany, Siemens, and would become inert if no such software was discovered.290 
The Stuxnet saga demonstrates the need for strict oversight when deploying 
cyber-weapons capable of self-propagation, and highlights a very plausible 
danger associated with those weapon systems. 
Sentinel- and Infiltrator-type AI constructs would require the ability to learn 
and self-propagate. For a Sentinel-type AI, the learning ability would enable it 
to better defend against a wide variety of cyberattack methods, and continue to 
defend against new threats as they emerge. Similarly, an Infiltrator-type AI 
would operate most efficiently by learning which intrusion methods were most 
successful against corresponding defense strategies. The learning functionality 
would not need to operate like that of a human; instead, the AI’s learning abil-
ity would allow the constructs to best adapt to their environments in accord-
ance with their programming. An Index that contained every approved and 
prohibited function as well as the types of systems with which the AI could 
and could not interface would allow an Infiltrator-type AI to operate with max-
imum efficiency. 
Problems could arise if an Index item was listed improperly, or if a prohibit-
ed system possessed characteristics of a system approved for autonomous infil-
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tration. In that instance, an Infiltrator AI could determine that it was authorized 
to autonomously perform an action on an approved system, when in reality the 
action or the target would have required handler oversight. Infiltrator would 
not be disobeying orders or acting of its own accord, it would be operating ac-
cording to its programming, even if the outcomes are contrary to what its han-
dlers intended. This could lead to a situation where Infiltrator would spread 
unchecked through networked systems potentially across the world, not be-
cause it was acting out of malice, but because it was operating in accordance 
with its programming. This could lead to bigger problems if Infiltrator began 
executing sabotage and disruption subroutines while embedded in unapproved 
networks. 
For artificial intelligence with learning capability, the runaway train scenario 
does not depend on unexpectedly-developed maliciousness, but rather undesir-
able actions taken in accordance with preprogrammed parameters as a result of 
stimuli in the environment. This is already an issue of notable concern for 
Google, which has begun developing a “kill-switch” for their artificial intelli-
gence programs that operate self-driving automobiles.291 Google’s kill-switch 
would operate to prevent a self-driving vehicle from breaking traffic laws – 
specifically, a vehicle that breaks a traffic law to avoid a crash may learn to 
break other traffic laws to achieve its objectives (reaching a destination).292 
Applied to Infiltrator, a handler-operated interruption system could be used to 
prevent Infiltrator from executing prohibited functions, or interfacing with 
prohibited systems as it searched for access points, vulnerabilities, and learned 
new infiltration strategies.  Constant surveillance and handler direction over an 
artificial intelligence construct operating in cyberspace would be vital to avoid 
a runaway train situation. Quickly identifying program bugs and other errors in 
coding would also be required to prevent a construct like Infiltrator from oper-
ating outside of its parameters. 
2. Mirror, Mirror 
Exact numbers vary, but corporate espionage and theft of trade secrets costs 
the global economy hundreds of billions of dollars every year.293 For individual 
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American enterprises the numbers are drastically smaller – in the tens of bil-
lions range – but the damage dealt by the theft of trade secrets can still be crip-
pling.294 In 2012, Chinese nationals were arrested in connection with an attempt 
to steal cellular-glass insulation technology from an American company.295 The 
value of the company’s secret was estimated at $272 million.296 Technology 
pilfered by a tech-savvy competitor can be used to devastating effect against 
the original creator of that technology. It stands to reason that an AI weapon 
system would also be susceptible to reverse engineering, but the consequences 
of such an event could be felt on a global scale; instead of corporate trade se-
crets or sensitive government files, a reverse engineered AI could provide 
cyber-threat actors with a devastating new weapon. 
Sentinel- and Infiltrator-type AI constructs would both require the ability to 
embed their code on systems and survive efforts to wipe their components, a 
function possessed by the suspiciously-advanced malware developed by the 
enigmatic Equation Group.297 This function would enable the AI to automati-
cally resurrect itself at a later date, or upon prompting from a handler. These 
AI would also require the ability to completely purge any trace of their pres-
ence from a compromised network to prevent unauthorized access to their 
code. No security measure is perfect, however, and it is possible that a situa-
tion could arise where some unauthorized person, organization, or even a sov-
ereign entity could gain access to the AI code. 
Sentinel- and Infiltrator-type AI constructs would need to operate in tandem, 
cooperating with one another to achieve their offensive and defensive objec-
tives. This would require a sort of friend-or-foe identification protocol which 
would prevent Sentinel from blocking Infiltrator access, or prevent Infiltrator 
from attacking a Sentinel-protected computer. The friend-or-foe ID system 
would also prevent unnecessary complications in operations which require 
stealth, speed, and participation from both constructs. 
Admiral Michael Rogers, commander of U.S. Cyber Command, believes 
that a devastating cyberattack will claim human lives by 2025.298 While artifi-
cial intelligence could provide the protection needed to ward off attacks of this 
kind, it could also act as the aggressor. Reverse-engineered AI counterparts to 
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Sentinel and Infiltrator – let’s call them Cloak and Dagger – could inflict dam-
age on multiple fronts simultaneously to devastating effect. 
If Cloak and Dagger were reverse-engineered from Sentinel and Infiltrator 
components, these analogue constructs could make use of this friend-or-foe 
protocol and spread through protected networks undetected and without re-
sistance. A Sentinel construct guarding the computer networks of a multi-
national, billion-dollar corporation might not recognize Dagger as an intruder 
and permit it access. Infiltrator might not attack a critical military system 
guarded by a Cloak construct using Sentinel’s friend-or-foe protocol. Cloak 
and Dagger could spread through otherwise protected networks and cause 
damage while Sentinel and Infiltrator would essentially ignore them. 
3. Terminator 
Technology does not evolve in a vacuum; it is driven by demand. War de-
mands the technology to best protect a sovereign’s interests, whether that pro-
tection necessitates defense or offence. Recent years have seen a push towards 
automating military force, and AI and robotics research appear poised to inter-
sect in a big way in the near future. Unmanned aerial drones already see signif-
icant use in the theater of kinetic warfare. Drones can accomplish a limited 
range of military objectives without endangering the lives of troops on the 
ground. Most drones still rely on human operators, who can direct the craft 
from half a world away. Until recently the idea of autonomous, robotic soldiers 
has been relegated to the realm of science fiction.299 That might not remain the 
status quo for much longer.300 Autonomous weapon systems already see appli-
cation in the military; some examples are described in the introduction. These 
weapon systems still rely on varying degrees of human operation, but few (if 
any) of them utilize autonomous robotics. 
As robotics technology advances, direct human oversight might not be nec-
essary. Advanced locomotion – and accompanying advanced AI – would re-
duce or eliminate robots’ reliance on humans for troubleshooting, maintenance, 
or physical assistance navigating terrain in the field. As an autonomous, robot-
ic military future becomes possible, many voices in the international communi-
ty have spoken out against hastily applying these technologies in the theater of 
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war.301 The Convention on Conventional Weapons held at the United Nations 
in April, 2016 concluded their deliberations by “call[ing] on all states to adopt 
a prohibition on the development, production, and use of fully autonomous 
weapons.”302 
Even without the looming concerns of autonomous military robots, military 
forces continue to become increasingly more reliant upon cyberspace to con-
duct their operations. If autonomous robots do see wide application in armed 
forces, this reliance will require the highest level of cybersecurity to ensure the 
automated component could not be compromised. Computers are not the only 
vulnerable targets anymore – power plants, self-driving cars, and even some 
pacemakers are susceptible to cyber-threat actors, as discussed earlier in the 
article. Any other autonomous technology, including a mechanized military 
force, would share at least some of the same vulnerabilities. 
If technological automation becomes the norm for military applications, the 
already-high bar for cybersecurity standards will only increase. A cyber-threat 
actor could theoretically kill a person by tampering with their remotely-
accessible pacemaker. Tampering with an entire army, or repurposing its sol-
diers for sinister purposes, raises the potential for harm even higher. The runa-
way train danger exists here too. Faulty programming or undesirable learning 
patterns could result in autonomous soldiers failing to distinguish between val-
id targets and non-combatants. Ensuring that artificially intelligent autonomous 
military applications are adequately protected from cyber-threat actors, requir-
ing close supervision by human handlers, and developing a failsafe kill-switch 
option would be vital before deploying such technology in the field. 
II. Necessity 
Before the United States deployed its nuclear weaponry against Japan in 
World War II, the U.S. was drawn into the war after the attack on Pearl Har-
bor. Some cybersecurity experts believe that a cyberspace equivalent to Pearl 
Harbor is on the horizon.303 A cyberattack on such a scale would likely result in 
significant human casualties. In the decades following the first deployment of 
nuclear weapons, nuclear power saw widespread proliferation across the globe. 
The possession of nuclear weaponry by multiple nations gave rise to the doc-
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trine of deterrence by way of the threat of mutually assured destruction.304 A 
nuclear war between two nuclear power states would have devastating and far 
reaching consequences on such a high order of magnitude that no nation would 
willingly incite a nuclear conflict by firing first – with North Korea possibly 
being an exception.305 A CWMD could give rise to a new doctrine of deter-
rence wherein no state would willingly incite a cyberwar against an AI-capable 
nation out of fear of the ensuing conflict wreaking havoc across cyberspace. 
The cyber-Pearl Harbor concept has its share of detractors as well, and some 
voices go so far as to claim that the notion of a cyber-Pearl Harbor is a myth.306 
Detractors are quick to point out that using historical acts of physical war 
amounts to little more than hyperbole when using such events to describe ac-
tions taking place in cyberspace.307 This argument uses the same logic as the 
“code can’t kill” line of reasoning purported by detractors of cyberwar as a 
concept. That is not, however, the crux of the detractor argument against the 
occurrence of a cyber-Pearl Harbor. Instead, detractors point to the difficulty of 
attribution – being able to identify the identity of the threat actor – and the 
scale of cyberattacks to date.308 
Furthermore, current cyberespionage strategies appear to be working just fi-
ne for cyber-threat actors who continue to commit cybercrimes against the 
United States. China pledged in 2015 to assist the United States in protecting 
cyberspace from crime.309 However, the country is still suspected to be respon-
sible for “years of large-scale cyber attacks that officials say have cost [the 
United States] billions of dollars in stolen intellectual property and compro-
mised networks[.]”310 Russia has also launched cyberattacks against U.S. net-
                                                 
 304 Cold War: A Brief History: Nuclear Deterrence, ATOMIC ARCHIVE, 
http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/coldwar/page15.shtml (last visited Sept. 23, 2016). 
 305 How potent are North Korea’s threats? BBC (Sept. 15, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21710644. 
 306 See generally Henry Farrell, Cyber-Pearl Harbor is a myth, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2013/11/11/cyber-pearl-
harbor-is-a-myth. 
 307 Henry Farrell, The hack on the U.S. government was not a ‘cyber Pearl Harbor’ (but 
it was a very big deal), WASH. POST (June 15, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/06/15/the-hack-on-the-u-s-
government-was-not-a-cyber-pearl-harbor-but-it-was-a-very-big-deal. 
 308 Sharon Weinberger, Cyber Pearl Harbor: Why hasn’t a mega attack happened yet?, 
BBC (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130820-cyber-pearl-harbor-a-
real-fear. 
 309 Jane Perlez, Xi Jinping Pledges to Work With U.S. to Stop Cybercrimes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept., 22, 2015, at A11. 
 310 Bill Gertz, China Continuing Cyber Attacks on U.S. Networks, WASH. FREE BEACON 
(Mar. 18, 2016), http://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-continuing-cyber-attacks-on-
u-s-networks. 
2017] Manhattan_Project.exe 153 
 
works, such as the email system used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.311 Launching 
a cyberattack on a scale large enough to cause physical damage and inflict hu-
man casualties may be possible by a powerful nation-state actor, but such an 
event would most likely draw the cyber-threat actor into a physical conflict or 
even physical warfare. It does not behoove any nation states currently acting in 
the capacity of a cyber-threat actor against the United States to escalate their 
operations to the point of provoking a kinetic military confrontation. 
However, simply because an event has yet to take place, or because an ac-
tion would lead to serious repercussions for the actor, does not make an unlike-
ly event impossible, or even improbable. The corporate and government espio-
nage objectives of China and Russia might not be shared by the more ideologi-
cal governments of Iran or North Korea. The objectives and missions of sover-
eign nation-states change as leaders with new beliefs and attitudes rise to pow-
er. What stands to reason today may not be so tomorrow, and so it is impera-
tive to prepare for that tomorrow. 
Artificial intelligence provides a solution to the cyberwar problem. It can be 
used as an effective tool for both offense and defense, and it can intelligently 
respond to multiple threats simultaneously with unparalleled swiftness. Strict 
human handler oversight is necessary, from early development to field opera-
tions, to ensure that AI constructs operate as desired and achieve desired out-
comes. Human oversight would need to evolve alongside the AI, determining 
how much – or how little – control would be required in any given situation. 
Simulating offensive and defensive strategies before engaging the AI in field 
operations would allow an AI weapon system to be implemented in such a way 
as to avoid undesirable outcomes and to minimize unnecessary damage if of-
fensive strategies are required. Risk to human lives in armed kinetic conflict 
could be significantly reduced, and much of the intangible damage and inter-
ference caused by an AI weapon system in cyberspace could be stopped or 
even reversed. International laws that govern and restrict the use of kinetic 
weapons in traditional warfare can apply, to an extent, to the use of cyber-
weapons in cyberwarfare. By using existing legal concepts where applicable to 
conduct in cyberspace, artificial intelligence can provide both safety and secu-
rity when accessing cyberspace and a highly effective weapon to use against 
those who would threaten it. 
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